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January 1, 2001 through
May 1, 2002
P U B L I C  O V E R S I G H T  B O A R D
CHARLES A. BOWSHER
Chairman, 1999 - present; joined
Board in 1997; Comptroller
General of the United States and
head of the General Accounting
Office, 1981-1996; Partner of
Arthur Andersen & Co., 1971-
1981; Assistant Secretary of the
Navy-Financial Management,
1967-1971; presently a director
of several public companies.
DONALD J. KIRK
Vice Chairman, 1999 - January
18, 2002; joined Board in 1995;
Financial Accounting Standards
Board, member 1973-1977,
Chairman 1978-1986; Partner of
Price Waterhouse & Co., 1967-
1973; Columbia Business
School, Professor 1987-1994,
Executive-in-Residence, 1995-
2000; presently a director of
several public companies;
received the AICPA’s Gold Medal
Award for Distinguished Service.
NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE
Joined Board in 2000; Chairman
of the Executive Committee,
Lockheed Martin Corp. since
1997; Chairman and CEO, 1996-
1997; President, 1995-1996;
Chairman and CEO, Martin
Marietta Corp., 1987-1995;
Lecturer, Princeton University,
1997-1999; Assistant Secretary
of the Army, 1973-1975, and
Under Secretary, 1975-1977;
presently a director of several
public companies.
JOHN H. BIGGS
Joined Board in 2001; Chairman
and CEO of TIAA-CREF since
1993, President and COO, 1989-
1993; President and CEO of
Centerre Trust Company, 1985-
1989; presently a director of
several public companies.
AULANA L. PETERS
Joined Board in 2001; Retired
Partner in law firm of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Member
of the POB’s Panel on Audit
Effectiveness, 1998-2000; SEC
Commissioner, 1984-1988;
presently a director of several
public companies.
STAFF
JERRY D. SULLIVAN
Executive Director
CHARLES J. EVERS
Technical Director
JOHN F. CULLEN
Assistant Technical Director
ALAN H. FELDMAN
Assistant Technical Director
JOHN C. WEBER
Assistant Technical Director
LEGAL COUNSEL
ALAN B. LEVENSON
Fulbright & Jaworski LLP
A. A. Sommer, Jr.
The POB acknowledges
with regret and sadness the
passing of A. A. Sommer,
Jr., former Chairman of the
POB, on January 14, 2002.
Melvin R. Laird, former
POB member, once
observed that “during Al’s
tenure on the Board, which
coincided with a difficult
period in the accounting
profession, he inspired his
fellow Board members and
the whole profession with
his leadership. He ap-
proached each challenge
logically, calmly, cheer-
fully and with full
knowledge of the issues,
and he always articulated
reasonable solutions to
difficult issues.” Mr.
Sommer will be missed by
all who knew him.
1About the
Public
Oversight
Board and
the SEC
Practice
Section
P U B L I C  O V E R S I G H T  B O A R D
The Public Oversight Board
(POB)
An independent private
sector body, the Public
Oversight Board was created
in 1977 for the purpose of
overseeing and reporting on
the self-regulatory programs
of the SEC Practice Section
(SECPS) of the American
Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA). In
February 2001 the Board’s
oversight jurisdiction was
expanded to include the
activities of the Auditing
Standards Board (ASB) of
the AICPA. The POB is
responsible for monitoring
and commenting on matters
that affect public confidence
in the integrity of the audit
process. Funded by dues
paid by SECPS members,
the Board’s independence is
assured by its power to set
its own budget, establish its
own operating procedures,
and appoint its own mem-
bers, chairperson, and staff.
The Board consists of five
members with a broad
spectrum of business,
professional, and regulatory
experience. Pursuant to the
new Charter, the ceiling for
the POB’s funding was
initially set at $5.2 million to
cover its expanded oversight
responsibilities. Additional
funds may be authorized
should the need arise. The
Charter further provides that
the POB will select its
members from a slate
proposed by a nominating
committee. As indicated
elsewhere in this report, on
January 20, 2002 the Board
voted its intent to terminate
its existence and did so as of
May 1, 2002.
SEC Practice Section
The SECPS was founded in
1977 as part of the Division
for CPA Firms of the AICPA
and is overseen by the
Public Oversight Board. The
Section imposes member-
ship requirements and
administers two major
programs to help assure that
SEC registrants are audited
by member firms with
effective quality control
systems. The first is peer
review, a process by which
other accountants assess and
test compliance with the
quality control systems for
the accounting and auditing
practices of Section mem-
bers. The other is quality
control inquiry, which
reviews allegations of audit
failure contained in litigation
filed against member firms
involving SEC clients.
Membership in the SECPS
About 1,200 firms belong to
the SECPS, including
virtually all of the account-
ing firms that audit publicly
held companies. They audit
some 17,000 public compa-
nies that file reports with the
SEC. The requirements of
the SECPS affect more than
128,000 professionals at
member firms.
Member firms of the SECPS
must adhere to quality
control standards established
by the AICPA; have a peer
review every three years, the
results of which are main-
tained in a public file that
also is available on the
AICPA’s web site; and report
to the SECPS Quality
Control Inquiry Committee
(QCIC) litigation against the
firm that alleges deficiencies
in the audit of a SEC client.
Among other membership
requirements, firms must
periodically rotate the
partner in charge of each
SEC audit engagement and
conduct a concurring or
second partner preissuance
review of each SEC audit
engagement.
2Letter
from the
Board
L E T T E R  F R O M  T H E  B O A R D
The past 15 months have
been a busy and tumultuous
time for the Public Oversight
Board. As detailed elsewhere
in this annual report, the
Board and its staff carried
out their responsibilities to
oversee the peer review and
quality control inquiry
processes, to begin the
process of monitoring
implementation of the
recommendations of the
Panel on Audit Effective-
ness, to oversee the setting
of independence and
auditing standards, and to
attempt to carry out indepen-
dence reviews of the largest
accounting firms. In addi-
tion, and in accordance with
its new Charter, the POB
formed and convened a
Coordinating Task Force
consisting of the chairs of
each body within the POB’s
oversight jurisdiction to
exchange information
relating to each committee’s
activities.
These activities, however,
were overshadowed by the
decision of the POB on
January 20, 2002, to termi-
nate its existence. That
decision was made reluc-
tantly and as a matter of
principle. The Board has
represented the public
interest in overseeing the
self-regulatory programs of
the accounting profession
for 25 years and has always
sought to work closely with
the profession and the SEC
toward enhancing the
effectiveness of the pro-
grams under its purview.
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
announced on January 17,
2002 his proposal for a new
private sector regulatory
structure - a structure the
AICPA said was “unprec-
edented in the more than
100 year history of the
accounting profession” -
without any input or consul-
tation with respect to the
proposed changes with the
POB.
The proposal announced by
Chairman Pitt had been the
subject of discussions
between the accounting
profession and the SEC for
some time. The POB asked
to be included in these
discussions, but was not.
Being excluded from the
process, effectively undercut
the POB’s legitimacy as an
“overseer.” Under the
circumstances, the POB
concluded that to appear to
continue to conduct over-
sight activities could mislead
the public. Furthermore, the
POB was concerned that if it
were to continue during an
interim period before a new
governance structure were in
place, it would leave the
impression that the POB
approved of the SEC pro-
posal, which it did not.
Therefore, it felt that in the
public interest it had no
choice but to disband.
3n Following the decision to
withhold funding of these
special reviews, the Big 5
accounting firms agreed
with the SEC that the POB
should instead conduct more
limited independence
reviews of the large firms.
Despite this agreement, the
next 21 months were marked
by a singular lack of
progress. The POB, in the
end, was unable to conduct
the reviews.
n The POB, which for years
had carried out its oversight
responsibilities under a set
of bylaws adopted after it
was created in 1977,
believed that a formal
charter would improve the
independence of the Board.
The creation of a charter was
one of the primary recom-
mendations in 2000 of the
Panel on Audit Effective-
ness. Objections from the
AICPA and the firms caused
negotiations to drag out for
more than a year. Ultimately,
a new charter took effect in
February 2001.
Given these and other
circumstances, the POB
concluded that it was not
possible for it to adequately
oversee the accounting
profession. The five mem-
bers of the POB thus unani-
mously voted to disband
after an appropriate period
for a transition of its respon-
sibilities. This step was
considered by the POB to be
akin to what an auditor does
when it believes it must
resign from a client engage-
ment because it can no
longer carry out its responsi-
bilities. This decision was
taken only after careful
deliberation in view of the
Board’s high regard for the
work of the overwhelming
number of professionals in
the accounting and auditing
fields and the Board’s
commitment to self-regula-
tion as one element of an
oversight regime. In the end,
L E T T E R  F R O M  T H E  B O A R D
While this proposal was the
immediate event that trig-
gered the decision to dis-
band, three other events
contributed to the POB’s
decision:
n On May 3, 2000, the SEC
Practice Section (SECPS) -
an organization within the
American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) - took the unprec-
edented action of notifying
the POB that it would refuse
to pay, as part of the POB
budget, for the POB’s special
reviews of public account-
ing firms. The special
reviews in question had
been sought by the SEC to
determine whether the firms
had complied with SEC and
professional independence
standards.
4AICPA, the Big 5, and other
firms. The chair and vice
chair would be full time
employees of the Institute;
five other members would
serve on a part time basis.
All would be appointed by a
panel composed of the chair
of the SEC, the chair of the
Federal Reserve Board and
the Secretary of the Treasury.
Once named, the chair of the
IIA would join these three in
naming other members of
the board. Members of the
IIA board could be removed
only by two-thirds vote of
the board itself.
The SEC would have
oversight of the IIA, and the
SEC’s Office of the Chief
Accountant would be the
liaison to the IIA. Funding of
the IIA would be indepen-
dent of the firms and the
accounting profession. The
L E T T E R  F R O M  T H E  B O A R D
as the “conscience and
critic” of the profession’s
self-regulatory system (as
the Securities and Exchange
Commission labeled the
mission of the POB in
1980), the POB felt it had no
choice but to disband.
In deciding to disband, the
POB felt that it had an
obligation to provide its
views on how regulation of
the accounting profession
could be improved. It has
done this in the form of a
White Paper - The Road to
Reform: A White Paper From
The Public Oversight Board
On Legislation to Create a
New Private Sector Regula-
tory Structure for the Ac-
counting Profession. This
White Paper was released at
a hearing before the Senate
Banking Committee on
March 19, 2002, at which
POB Chairman Bowsher and
POB Member Peters gave
testimony. The White Paper
is printed in full and in-
cluded in this annual report.
In summary, the Public
Oversight Board strongly
believes that a new regula-
tory structure for the ac-
counting profession is both
essential and feasible.
However, the POB believes
that to be effective and to
restore trust in the account-
ing profession, such a
structure must be totally
independent of the account-
ing profession, although
with input from the profes-
sion. Further, the structure
should remain in the private
sector and be statutorily
based.
In the White Paper, the
Board recommends that
Congress create a new
Independent Institute of
Accountancy - the IIA - and
center all regulation under its
auspices. A seven-member
board would run the Institute
totally independent of the
important functions of the
Institute would include
oversight of all standard
setting bodies, yearly and
special reviews, investiga-
tory powers, international
liaison, and professional
education and training.
Beyond these core func-
tions, the POB White Paper
also contains a number of
recommendations it believes
should be incorporated in
any legislative reform
package. These include
certain limitations on non-
audit services to audit
clients, rotation of auditors
every seven years, a two
year “cooling off” period in
which engagement and other
partners associated with an
audit would be prohibited
from accepting employment
with an audit client, ex-
panded action to encourage
audit committees to take full
5responsibility for hiring,
evaluating, and (if neces-
sary) firing auditors, requir-
ing more timely and mean-
ingful disclosure of related
party transactions, and
requiring management of
public corporations to
prepare annual statements of
compliance with internal
controls to be filed with the
SEC, signed by the Chief
Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer, and
reviewed by the external
auditor.
The POB feels these reforms
are necessary if trust is to be
restored in the accounting
profession and the damage
done to the capital markets
by recent events is to be
repaired. The Board has
presented what it believes is
a sensible, workable plan for
reform. It is premised on the
firmly held belief that the
fundamental purpose of
regulation is to serve the
public interest and that of
investors. If this is to be
accomplished, regulation
must be totally independent
of the profession, it must
pull together all aspects of
regulation from standards to
discipline, it must be trans-
parent, and it must provide
for adequate funding and
staff.
In this last annual report, the
Board wishes to thank the
POB’s loyal staff. The Board
has been fortunate to have
the dedicated support of the
men and women who served
the public interest so well
under the leadership of POB
Executive Director Jerry
Sullivan. We are pleased that
they will continue to provide
interim service under an
agreement with the SEC
Practice Section until a new
and permanent regulatory
structure is in place.
L E T T E R  F R O M  T H E  B O A R D
Respectfully submitted,
Charles A. Bowsher Norman R. Augustine
Chairman
Aulana L. Peters John H. Biggs
6Functions of
the
Independent
Institute of
Accountancy
Important functions of the
Independent Institute of
Accountancy—the IIA—would
include:
Oversight:
The IIA would exercise
oversight for all standard
setting bodies, which would
remain in the private sector,
for accounting, auditing, and
independence, as well as
interpretations. Accounting
standards are just as impor-
tant as auditing and indepen-
dence standards. For this
reason, the POB believes the
Financial Accounting
Standards Board should be
brought under the umbrella
of the IIA, which would take
responsibility for its over-
sight and funding.
Reviews:
IIA employees would
conduct thorough and
comprehensive yearly
reviews of the annual
internal inspections of firms
that audit more than 100
public corporations each
year. Firm-on-firm peer
review would be discontin-
ued for such firms. Unlike
peer review, no activities of
a firm would be off limits to
Institute reviewers and the
process would produce
detailed public reports. For
firms that audit less than 100
public corporations yearly,
reviews would be performed
by other firms selected and
paid by the IIA. Their
reports would be addressed
to the IIA as the client of the
reviewer. In addition to the
reviews, IIA employees
would conduct special
reviews, when warranted.
Similar to those the SEC
originally asked the POB to
undertake, these reviews, for
example, could take a
systematic, in-depth look at
a firm’s systems, policies,
procedures, and operations.
If necessary, such special
reviews would delve into
questions affecting the firm’s
compliance with applicable
professional standards. As
with the yearly reviews,
reports of these special
reviews would be public.
Investigations:
An Office of Enforcement
and Discipline within the IIA
would have full authority to
investigate allegations of
wrongdoing by public
accounting firms and their
personnel. The POB recom-
mends giving the IIA the
privilege of confidentiality
as well as the power of
subpoena to compel testi-
mony and produce docu-
ments. Cases of alleged
misconduct would be
brought before IIA hearing
examiners. When warranted,
these examiners would
recommend to the IIA board
the imposition of sanctions,
ranging from fines to
expulsion from the profes-
sion. Cases could be referred
to the Justice Department for
possible prosecution, or to
the SEC, state boards of
accountancy, or other
agencies, as appropriate.
Funding:
Funding would be provided
through fees imposed on
public corporations in
amounts sufficient to cover
the costs of the Institute. The
POB strongly believes that
the funding mechanism must
be beyond the reach of the
profession to prevent it from
withholding necessary
funds, as it did in May of
2000.
International Liaison and
Professional Education:
The IIA would be charged
with coordinating interna-
tional liaison and overseeing
continuing professional
education.
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Activities
During the year ended
December 31, 2001 the
Board held six regularly
scheduled meetings and two
special meetings. A signifi-
cant portion of the Board’s
time at meetings up to
December 31, 2001 was
devoted to the initiation of
activities to discharge the
Board’s expanded responsi-
bilities under its new Charter.
During those meetings, the
Board followed the
profession’s progress in
implementing the recom-
mendations of the Panel on
Audit Effectiveness and the
status of the planning for the
special reviews of the
independence quality
controls of the eight largest
firms that are discussed
elsewhere in this report.
As more fully described in
later sections of this report,
the POB embraced its new
and broadened responsibili-
ties under its new Charter,
which was adopted February
9, 2001, with enthusiasm
and took major steps to
discharge them in the public
interest. Those steps in-
cluded recruiting and
training additional highly
experienced staff to assist in
conducting enhanced
oversight of traditional
SECPS activities, particularly
earlier and more extensive
oversight of the peer reviews
of the largest firms and pilot-
testing of peer review
enhancements. In addition,
our oversight of QCIC cases
was expanded to evaluate
the implementation of the
new disciplinary require-
ment. The Board and staff
conducted oversight of the
ASB standards-setting
process for the first time.
While a POB staff represen-
tative was assigned oversight
over the Independence
Standards Board’s (ISB)
independence standards-
setting, that assignment
proved to be short-lived
when, in July 2001, the ISB
voted to terminate its exist-
ence.
In accordance with the
Board’s Charter, the Board
conducted a three-day
outreach meeting - the first
day in Washington, DC and
the second and third days in
New York City - to solicit
views and recommendations
about the accounting
profession’s self-regulatory
program and the POB’s
oversight process. Participat-
ing in this meeting were the
Chief Accountant of the
SEC, the Comptroller of the
Currency, representatives
from the GAO, the chief
executive officers of the
eight largest firms, AICPA
and SECPS leadership, and
representatives from the
ASB, the Financial Account-
ing Standards Board (FASB),
the Transnational Auditors
Committee, and academia.
Guests were invited to other
Board meetings to enhance
the Board’s understanding of
issues facing the accounting
profession. We believe the
concept of an outreach
meeting should be given
consideration by the IIA
proposed in our White Paper
- The Road to Reform: A
White Paper From The
Public Oversight Board On
Legislation to Create a New
Private Sector Regulatory
Structure for the Accounting
Profession.
Also in accordance with the
Charter, the POB formed and
convened a Coordinating
Task Force consisting of the
chairs of each body within
the POB’s oversight jurisdic-
tion to exchange information
relating to each committee’s
activities. The Board’s Vice
Chairman served as the chair
of this task force. The first
meeting was also attended
by the chairs of several
bodies not within the
jurisdiction of the POB-the
Professional Ethics Execu-
tive Committee (PEEC), the
FASB, the Accounting
Standards Executive Com-
mittee, and the Peer Review
Board.
Sessions were held for the
Board to discuss develop-
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
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review program and the
innovations being pilot-
tested; the QCIC process,
particularly the implementa-
tion of the new disciplinary
requirements and coordina-
tion with the PEEC; and the
process of setting auditing
standards. Liaison roles were
assigned to Board members
relating to oversight of the
peer review, QCIC, and
auditing standards-setting
processes. Board members
also played active roles in
the oversight of the large
firm full-scope peer reviews.
The Board’s staff actively
participated in deliberations
of the various SECPS task
forces, particularly those
relating to establishing
guidelines for conducting
the pilot-tests of the peer
review innovations and
evaluating results.
During 2002 the Board held
five meetings during which
it decided to dissolve and
conducted business related
to transition matters and the
issuance of this final annual
report.
POB Actions Relating to
Enron Collapse
The Board has taken a
number of actions to protect
investors and maintain
confidence in our capital
markets in light of the Enron
collapse.
On January 17, 2002, the
Board sent individual letters
to the Chairman of the QCIC
and to the Chairman of the
ASB requesting that they
take action on a number of
issues raised by Enron’s
collapse. (These letters can
be found on the POB’s web
site.)
The letter to the QCIC
Chairman, copies of which
were sent to other interested
parties, including members
of Congress, the SEC, the
General Accounting Office
(GAO), the SECPS, the
AICPA, representatives from
the Big Five accounting
firms, the ASB and the
FASB, urged the QCIC to
review “Andersen’s audits of
Enron for the year 2000 and
relevant prior years to
determine whether the
alleged audit deficiencies
indicate[d] a need for
corrective measures by
Andersen in its system of
quality controls and whether
restrictions should be placed
on Enron engagement
personnel pursuant to the
QCIC’s recently adopted
disciplinary process (beyond
those recently taken by
Andersen).” (See “Quality
Control Inquiry Process” for
a status report of QCIC’s
inquiries into the case later
in this report.) The POB
also requested that the QCIC
look into discussions
between Andersen and
Enron’s audit committee
concerning Andersen’s
evaluation of the critical
accounting policies used in
Enron’s financial statements,
Andersen’s independence as
well as other matters. In
addition, the POB urged the
QCIC Chairman to “deter-
mine if there [were] profes-
sion-wide issues that needed
to be addressed” and, if
there were, to identify them
and refer them to the stan-
dard-setting bodies for
consideration and appropri-
ate action.
The January 17, 2002 letter
to the ASB Chairman, copies
of which were sent to the
same group of interested
parties as the letter of the
same date to the QCIC
Chairman, requested that the
ASB review and take
appropriate action on the
auditing issues related to the
Enron matter, including the
adequacy of auditing
guidance related to off-
balance sheet financing,
special purpose entities, and
energy and other commodity
contracts for which there is
no readily determinable
market.
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
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In addition, the POB was
actively involved in oversee-
ing the peer review of Arthur
Andersen LLP, Enron’s
outside auditors, which was
completed at the end of last
year. In connection with this
peer review of Andersen, the
peer reviewers extended
their procedures in view of
Enron’s November 2001
announcement that it would
restate its financial state-
ments for 1997 through
2000 and also the first two
quarters of 2001. The POB
staff provided substantial
oversight for this extended
peer review, including
discussing the extended
procedures with the peer
reviewers and visiting four
additional offices, one being
the Houston office that
conducted the Enron audit.
The extended peer review of
Andersen included addi-
tional procedures that
involved reviewing
Andersen’s policies, guid-
ance materials, training
programs and practice aids
with respect to those areas
that had been identified in
the restatements, namely,
special purpose entities,
issuance of equity instru-
ments for receivables,
energy trading contracts,
related party transactions,
and waived adjustments.
(See “Oversight of Large
Firms’ Peer Reviews”
elsewhere in this report for
further discussion of the
Andersen extended peer
review.)
In addition, the POB staff
will exercise oversight of the
QCIC, which will be consid-
ering allegations in the
Enron matter to determine
whether the facts indicated
deficiencies in Andersen’s
system of quality controls
and whether the auditing
engagement team complied
with professional standards.
Oversight of the Self-
Regulatory Structure of the
Auditing Profession
In last year’s Annual Report,
the POB noted that an
important milestone in the
history of the self-regulatory
system of the auditing
profession was reached on
February 9, 2001, when the
POB announced agreement
on a Charter aimed at
strengthening and broaden-
ing its oversight of the
profession. In connection
with the POB’s responsibili-
ties under its Charter, set
forth below is a status report
on developments relating to
the Panel on Audit Effective-
ness Report and Recommen-
dations, auditing standards
setting, auditor indepen-
dence, and the look-back
and special reviews of the
large firms’ independence
quality controls.
Status Report: The
Recommendations of the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness
The August 31, 2000 Report
of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness contained
recommendations directed at
15 groups of stakeholders in
the financial reporting
process. The POB strongly
believes that the public
interest demands that all the
recommendations made by
the Panel should be carefully
considered by each stake-
holder group and an expla-
nation given for non-
implementation or a devia-
tion from implementation of
the recommendation.
Therefore, the Board urges
the successor regulatory
organization to continue to
monitor implementation and
to take action to assure
appropriate implementation
of the Panel’s recommenda-
tions.
The Board and its staff
followed implementation of
the recommendations during
2001. At the direction of the
Board, the staff prepared a
report, POB Staff Status
Report: The Recommenda-
tions of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness as of February
15, 2002. This report is
available on the
POB’s web site
www.publicoversightboard.org.
It summarizes the extent to
which the various stakehold-
ers have responded to the
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
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most significant of the
Panel’s recommendations. It
is intended to be useful to
those responsible for regulat-
ing or overseeing the
accounting profession,
particularly the SEC, Con-
gress, and the GAO.
The Panel’s overall conclu-
sions included the following:
n The risk-based approach to
audits of financial state-
ments is appropriate, but it
needs to be enhanced,
updated, and implemented
more consistently.
n Auditors should perform
“forensic-type” procedures
on every audit to enhance
the prospects of detecting
material financial statement
fraud.
n The governance of the
auditing profession should
be enhanced through a
strengthened POB that
would oversee the setting of
auditing standards, the
monitoring of auditor
performance, and the
disciplining of auditors for
substandard performance, as
well as conduct special
reviews as appropriate.
Although a number of the
Panel’s recommendations
have been addressed by the
various stakeholders in the
financial reporting process,
no conclusions can be
drawn about the extent to
which the actions taken to
date have enhanced audit
effectiveness. The Panel’s
report was published less
than two years ago and, of
the recommendations that
were accepted, none of the
stakeholders have completed
the process of implemen-
tating the Panel’s recommen-
dations. In many cases, new
standards or other forms of
guidance or audit policy are
at the exposure draft stage;
in some cases, new
standards, guidance, or
policies have been
promulgated but are not yet
effective; and in most cases
audits have not yet been
performed under those
standards, guidance, or
policies. The POB believes
that the implementation of
those Panel recommenda-
tions will enhance audit
effectiveness; however, it
believes that sufficient time
has not yet passed for the
benefits of its recommenda-
tions to be measured.
Representative John Dingell
has indicated his interest in
the Panel’s recommenda-
tions relating to the gover-
nance of the auditing
profession and has requested
that the GAO review and
report on their implementa-
tion. In that regard, represen-
tatives of the POB met with
GAO staff and the POB
prepared a comprehensive
response to GAO’s inquiries,
The Public Oversight
Board’s Response to GAO’s
June 14, 2001 “Approach
Questions”/Meeting with the
Public Oversight Board
(Congressional Request
Related to Chapter 6 of the
August 2000 Report of the
Panel on Audit Effective-
ness). The GAO report is
expected to be issued in
May 2002. In its letter to the
SEC Chief Accountant dated
April 4, 2002, the POB
recommended that, in view
of the importance of the
Panel’s recommendations,
the SEC take appropriate
steps to assure that the
POB’s responsibility for
monitoring the implementa-
tion of those recommenda-
tions is taken on, and
fulfilled, by an independent
entity. (This letter is on the
POB web site.) Such action
by the SEC would serve the
public interest by promoting
implementation of the
Panel’s recommendations,
while at the same time
assuring the independence
and objectivity of the
monitoring process. The
POB also recommended that
the independent entity issue
periodic status reports that
would be available to the
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
12
public. In addition, the POB
recommended that the SEC
consider establishing an
independent entity, like The
Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the
Treadway Commission
(COSO), to take on the
responsibility for monitoring
the Panel’s recommenda-
tions.
Auditing Standards-Setting
The POB’s February 2001
Charter gave it oversight of
the ASB for the first time.
The ASB promulgates
auditing, attestation, and
quality control standards to
be observed by members of
the AICPA in accordance
with its Bylaws and Code of
Professional Conduct. The
ASB is composed of 15
members, including repre-
sentatives from international,
national, regional, and local
firms, as well as representa-
tives from accounting
education and state govern-
ment. The POB’s recom-
mendation for a successor
private sector regulatory
organization includes the
ASB under its oversight, as
described in the White Paper.
Independence Standards-
Setting
The POB’s February 2001
Charter gave it oversight of
the ISB’s independence
standards-setting process.
Since the ISB voted to
terminate its existence in
July 2001, the POB staff has
observed public meetings of
the AICPA’s Professional
Ethics Executive Committee.
The POB Charter provides
that the POB would monitor
the agenda of PEEC to
identify rule-making,
regulatory, and standard-
setting activities that relate to
the audit of public compa-
nies for the purpose of
communicating information
relating to such activities to
the Coordinating Task Force,
formed by the POB, for
appropriate consideration.
The PEEC sets indepen-
dence standards that all
AICPA members are obliged
to follow in the conduct of
audits. (If the SEC has
established a more stringent
independence requirement
in a specified area, auditors
are required to follow the
SEC requirement with
respect to their public
clients.)
Look-Back and Special
Reviews of Large Firms’
Independence Quality
Controls
In a letter to the POB dated
December 9, 1999, then
SEC Chief Accountant Lynn
Turner expressed concern
that public accounting firms
possibly lacked adequate
quality controls for indepen-
dence. As a step to “safe-
guard the public interest,” he
“strongly recommend[ed]”
that the POB undertake “a
special review of SECPS
member firms’ current
compliance” with indepen-
dence requirements. On
December 21, 1999, the
POB agreed to do so. Two
weeks later, on January 6,
2000, the SEC announced
that an internal investigation
at PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP (PwC) had disclosed
more than 8,000 indepen-
dence violations of varying
degrees of significance. At
this time, there were publicly
expressed concerns that the
widespread independence
violations at PwC might also
be found at other large
accounting firms if they
were subject to a similar
compliance review. Against
this background, the POB
commenced preliminary
work on the special reviews
in January 2000, and had
meetings with the firms to
discuss the reviews.
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
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POB. The POB agreed to do
so, and commenced prelimi-
nary work on these reviews
in November 2000. Between
then and January 2002, a
period of more than a year,
the POB did a substantial
amount of work preparing to
conduct the independence
reviews. This work included
a request for documents sent
to the firms and the SEC
staff in July 2001 as well as
comprehensive work
programs for both phase I
(evaluation of design and
implementation effective-
ness) and phase II (testing
and evaluation of operating
effectiveness) of the reviews,
sent to the firms and SEC
staff in October 2001 and
January 2002, respectively.
In addition, the POB was
involved in working with the
firms on a confidentiality
agreement for the indepen-
dence reviews. The POB’s
efforts to enter into a confi-
dentiality agreement with the
firms, going back to July
2001, met with no success.
In addition, by the middle of
January 2002, the POB still
had not been able to obtain
from the firms documents it
had requested for the
independence reviews in
July 2001. This lack of
progress in conducting the
independence reviews was
one of the factors that led to
the POB voting to terminate
its existence.
In its letter of January 21,
2002 informing Chairman
Pitt of the POB’s decision to
terminate, the POB stated
that arrangements had to be
made for a transition of its
responsibilities. (This letter is
on the POB web site.) In this
regard, the POB specifically
noted that plans had to be
made to transfer from the
POB to an independent
entity the conduct of, and
issuance of public reports
on, the special independence
reviews of the Big 5 ac-
counting firms, agreed to by
the SEC and the firms in
June 2000.
In a letter to the SEC and the
firms dated March 5, 2002,
the POB set forth its position
on the transfer of its respon-
sibility for conducting the
independence reviews and
issuing public reports to an
independent person and
discussed the background of
the independence reviews.
This letter can be found on
the POB’s web site.
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Then, in early May 2000,
the POB’s work on the
special reviews was stopped
by a decision of the SECPS
to cut off the POB’s funding
for them. Arthur Levitt, the
Chairman of the SEC, stated
that this was “a significant
setback to self-regulation
and independent oversight”
and raised “serious questions
as to the profession’s com-
mitment to self-regulation.”
Melvin Laird, former
Congressman and Secretary
of Defense and the longest-
serving member of the POB,
said that this was “the worst
incident in my 17 years” on
the POB.
The special reviews did not
go forward, but shortly
afterward, in June 2000, the
SEC and the Big 5 firms
entered into a “Term Sheet
for Independence Look-
Back Testing Program”
(term sheet), which called
for the POB to conduct more
limited independence
reviews.
Subsequently, on October
10, 2000, the POB received
a letter from Mr. Turner
asking that the POB do the
independence reviews called
for by the term sheet “in lieu
of” the special reviews
previously requested in his
December 1999 letter to the
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On March 19, 2002, the SEC
announced plans for com-
pleting reviews of the
design, implementation, and
operating effectiveness of
each of the five largest firms’
systems for assuring compli-
ance with the independence
rules. The POB is hopeful
that these reviews and the
reports on the reviews will
be timely completed in a
manner consistent with the
POB’s March 5, 2002 letter,
particularly with regard to
the scope of the reviews and
form and content of the
reports.
Efforts to Enhance Peer
Review
In response to a Panel
recommendation, during the
2001-2002 peer review year,
the SECPS pilot-tested a
number of innovations in the
peer reviews of the 13
largest firms in recognition
of the greater public interest
in their audit practices.
These innovations were
intended to make the peer
review process more effec-
tive by focusing peer
reviewers and the firms’
internal inspection programs
on some of the higher risk
areas of audits. Our over-
sight of the pilot-tests is
discussed later in this report
under “POB Oversight of the
Peer Review Process.”
The risk areas covered in the
pilot-tests were those
identified by the Panel on
Audit Effectiveness as
requiring additional attention
by auditors, peer reviewers,
and standards-setters.
Reviewers made qualitative
assessments of auditing
decisions and communi-
cated those assessments to
the reviewed firms. The
POB believes that focusing
on risk areas and the audit-
ing decisions in those areas
enhances the peer review
process. In addition, a series
of topics, including “tone at
the top” and independence,
were the subject of focus
group meetings. The goals
of these meetings were to
identify (a) areas where the
firm’s quality control
policies and procedures
could be strengthened, (b)
auditing or other standards
that need reconsideration,
and (c) best practices that
might be shared across
firms.
In addition, those large firms
that were not scheduled for a
triennial peer review were
subjected to “specified
annual procedures.” Those
procedures focused on the
firms’ internal inspection and
monitoring procedures to
determine whether they were
sufficiently comprehensive
to identify the need to (a)
revise policies and proce-
dures, (b) update guidance
materials and practice aids,
(c) improve professional
development activities, and
(d) achieve increased
compliance with firm
policies and procedures.
The “specified annual
procedures” reviews were
substantially completed as
pilot-tests. However, the
contemplated non-public
reports were not issued. The
pilot-tests did not contem-
plate public reporting; they
were performed to develop
additional guidance for
developing specified annual
procedures and for develop-
ing reports on the results.
That guidance has now been
developed, with input from
the POB’s staff, and the Peer
Review Committee (PRC)
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
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has approved it for imple-
mentation in the 2002-2003
peer review year.
While the reviewers col-
lected some information on
best practices and matters for
the attention of standards-
setters, the information was
not considered by the PRC
to be important enough to be
reported to others. The
reviewers’ experiences with
the pilot program, however,
were discussed at two
debriefing sessions held by
the PRC. The POB encour-
ages the PRC to collect such
information in a more formal
manner during the 2002
peer reviews.
During the year, peer review
reports reflected the revi-
sions the PRC made to the
peer review reporting
standards to provide more
information about the
reviews. For example, the
new reports better describe
the objectives of a peer
review and how they are
conducted. In addition, the
peer review reports were
streamlined to make them
more understandable in
situations where the reports
are modified or adverse.
The innovations imple-
mented in the 2001-2002
year have the capability of
enhancing the conduct and
transparency of peer re-
views. The Board believes,
however, that the size and
complexity of the large
auditing firms require annual
reviews. Our further recom-
mendations for enhancing
the reviews of firms and
other aspects of the gover-
nance of the profession are
included in The Road to
Reform: A White Paper From
The Public Oversight Board
On Legislation to Create a
New Private Sector Regula-
tory Structure for the Ac-
counting Profession (the
White Paper), which is
included in this report.
The Board believes that it is
in the public interest to
continue the peer review
program during the transi-
tion period before the
establishment of a successor
regulatory structure. In that
regard, the SECPS Executive
Committee chair stated in a
letter to the SEC Chief
Accountant dated February
15, 2002 that the SECPS
intends to continue the self-
regulatory programs,
including peer review,
during the transition.
The PRC has recently
approved enhanced guid-
ance for conducting reviews
for 2002-2003. The PRC has
identified eleven risk areas,
including auditing deriva-
tives and special purpose
entities, that will be focused
on in both full-scope peer
reviews and in the specified
annual procedures. We
understand that the specified
annual procedures will be
performed for the “Big 5
firms” not subject to full
reviews in 2002 and for
other firms opting to subject
their firms to such reviews,
and that the reviewers will
issue reports that will be
available to the PRC and the
POB and SEC staffs, who
will continue to oversee the
peer review process.
P O B  A C T I V I T I E S
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SECPS
Executive
Committee
The Executive Committee is
responsible for the self-regula-
tory activities of the SEC
Practice Section, which include
setting membership requirements
for member firms. Membership
requirements are intended to
enhance the quality of practice
by CPA firms before the SEC.
A Board member and staff
participate in each meeting
of the SECPS Executive
Committee and its Planning
Committee. As discussed
below, since our last Annual
Report:
n The Executive Committee
updated the independence
membership requirement
and amended the concurring
partner review membership
requirement to cover
quarterly reviews.
n The Professional Issues Task
Force (PITF) issued three
Practice Alerts.
n The public files of SECPS
member firms became
accessible on the SECPS’s
web site.
As provided in the Board’s
Charter, the POB was
consulted on nominations by
the SECPS for membership
on the Executive Committee
and concurred in the nomi-
nations for the chair of that
committee, which were
approved by the committee
and the AICPA board.
Requirements for Specified
Annual Procedures
In January 2002 the SECPS
Executive Committee
approved a requirement that
firms meeting certain
criteria, to be established by
the PRC, undergo “specified
annual procedures” in years
between triennial peer
reviews. The PRC voted to
require firms with 500 or
more SEC clients to undergo
such reviews; they are
optional for other firms.
Revised Independence Quality
Control Requirements
In November 2000 the SEC
issued its final rules on
auditor independence, which
extensively revised the
previous rules. The Execu-
tive Committee considered
these new rules and on
October 10, 2001 adopted
an amendment to the
independence quality
control membership require-
ment that became effective
January 1, 2002. The
amendment is intended to
enhance compliance with
the SEC’s new rules, particu-
larly with respect to a
member firm’s foreign-
associated firms.
The letter transmitting the
amended membership
requirement to SECPS firms
noted that the final SEC rules
provide a safe harbor for
accounting firms for inad-
vertent impairments of
independence by covered
persons. The impairment
must be eliminated as soon
as possible after discovery,
and the accounting firm
must maintain a quality
control system that provides
reasonable assurance that the
firm and its personnel do not
lack independence.
To qualify for the safe
harbor, firms with more than
500 SEC attest clients are
expected to include eight
specified features in their
independence quality
control systems. Other firms
also should have a system,
but it does not have to
include all eight features to
qualify for the safe harbor.
The amended membership
requirement specifies that,
effective January 1, 2002,
firms with more than 500
SEC clients must, among
other things, have an
automated system to identify
investments of partners and
managers that might impair
independence.
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No matter how many SEC
clients a firm has, for the
firm to qualify for the safe
harbor, the SEC rules specify
that the quality control
system encompass “at least
all employees and associated
entities of the accounting
firm participating in the
engagement, including
employees and associated
entities located outside the
United States.” Accounting
firms with more than 500
SEC clients have until
December 31, 2002 to
implement the eight features
in offices outside the U.S.
Prior to that date, to come
within the safe harbor, those
foreign offices must meet a
“reasonable assurance”
standard for compliance
with independence stan-
dards.
Revised Concurring Partner
Review Requirement
At its January 2002 meeting,
the Executive Committee
approved a revision to the
concurring partner review
requirement that is designed
to enhance the reliability of
interim financial informa-
tion. Effective for quarters
ending on or after March 31,
2002, concurring partners
must be involved in reviews
of interim financial informa-
tion in Form 10-Q or 10-
QSB. Member firms are
expected to have policies
and procedures in place that
require concurring partners
to discuss with the engage-
ment team, before complet-
ing an interim review, any
matters identified in the
review that involve a signifi-
cant risk of material mis-
statement of the financial
statements, including the
footnotes. That involvement
is required to be docu-
mented.
PITF Practice Alerts
The Executive Committee’s
Professional Issues Task
Force issued three Practice
Alerts: Common Peer Review
Recommendations, Audit
Considerations in Times of
Economic Uncertainty, and
Communications with the
Securities and Exchange
Commission. These are
available on the SECPS web
site (www.aicpa.org/mem-
bers/div/SECPS) and in the
AICPA Technical Practice
Aids. The Board’s staff
participates in the accumula-
tion and consideration of
practice issues at PITF
meetings.
SECPS Public File
Now on the Web Site
Beginning in December
2001 the public files of
SECPS member firms
became accessible on the
SECPS web site identified
above. The available infor-
mation includes the most
recent peer review report,
letter of comments (if any),
and the firm’s response (if
applicable). In addition, the
firm’s three most recent
annual reports to the Practice
Section and other relevant
documents are available, for
example, a description of an
undertaking by a firm that is
not yet completed to demon-
strate to the Peer Review
Committee’s satisfaction that
significant quality control
deficiencies have been
eliminated.
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Peer
Review
Process
P O B  R E P O R T S  O N
Virtually all U.S. accounting
firms that audit publicly held
companies belong to the SEC
Practice Section and are
required to submit to a triennial
peer review of their accounting
and auditing practice. The
objectives of peer review are to
evaluate whether the reviewed
firm (1) designed its system of
quality control for its account-
ing and auditing practice to
meet the requirements of the
Quality Control Standards
established by the AICPA, (2)
complied with its quality control
policies and procedures to
provide reasonable assurance of
complying with professional
standards, and (3) complied with
the membership requirements of
the SECPS, in all material
respects. A peer review consists
of tests directed at the design of
and compliance with the
reviewed firm’s system of quality
control to provide the firm with
reasonable, not absolute,
assurance of complying with
professional standards. Conse-
quently, an unmodified opinion
on a firm’s system of quality
control is not intended to, and
does not, provide assurance with
respect to any individual audit
conducted by the firm or that
none of the financial statements
audited by the firm will be
restated.
The SECPS Peer Review
Committee sets the standards for
conducting and reporting on
peer reviews and oversees the
administration of the peer
review program. The PRC
considers each peer review,
evaluates the reviewer’s
competency and performance,
and examines every report,
letters of comments if any, and
accompanying response from the
reviewed firm. Once accepted by
the PRC, the reports and letters
of comments and response are
placed in a public file main-
tained at the AICPA and are also
placed on the AICPA web site.
POB Oversight of the Peer
Review Process
Over a three-year period, all
1,230 U.S. accounting firms
that belong to the SECPS
undergo a peer review. This
POB annual report discusses
the peer reviews conducted
during the 2000-2001 peer
review year. The peer
reviews were conducted in
2000, and were processed
by the PRC in 2000 and
2001. In addition, the report
discusses the significant
improvements in the peer
review process that were
implemented on selected
reviewed firms in a pilot-test
for peer reviews conducted
in the 2001-2002 peer
review year.
During the 2000-2001 peer
review year, 368 SECPS
peer reviews were per-
formed, including 256
reviews of firms that audit
SEC registrants and 112
reviews of firms with no
SEC clients. During the
2001-2002 peer review year,
410 SECPS peer reviews
were scheduled, including
274 reviews of firms that
audit SEC registrants and
136 reviews of firms with no
SEC clients.
The Board’s staff performs
some level of oversight of
every peer review. The
levels of oversight are: on-
site oversight and working
paper review, working paper
review only, and selective
working paper review. The
level of oversight varies with
the profile of the firm and
the peer reviewer. Firms with
large numbers of public
clients, a history of perfor-
mance problems (including
litigation, regulatory en-
forcement actions, and prior
reviews resulting in modified
reports), and firms undergo-
ing their initial SECPS peer
review receive more inten-
sive oversight than other
firms. Similarly, the Board’s
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staff closely monitors peer
reviewers who have had past
performance problems.
Oversight of Large Firms’
Peer Reviews
2000-2001 peer review year
During the 2000-2001 peer
review year, there was one
“Big 5” firm peer review,
that of Pricewater-
houseCoopers LLP (PwC).
That review resulted in an
unmodified report, accom-
panied by a letter of com-
ment, both of which are
available on the AICPA web
site.
The Board’s staff conducted
comprehensive, “real-time”
oversight of the PwC peer
review. POB staff was
involved in planning the
review, visiting several
practice offices during the
conduct of the review,
reviewing detailed and
summarized findings,
developing the appropriate
report and letter of comment,
and communicating the
review findings to PwC’s
senior management at the
firm-wide exit conference.
The Board’s Vice Chairman
served as the Board’s liaison
member on this review and
participated in the firm-wide
exit conference.
2001-2002 peer review year
As discussed in the Board’s
2000 annual report, the
SECPS Executive Commit-
tee approved the PRC’s plan
to modify significantly the
approach to conducting and
reporting on peer reviews.
The PRC decided, before
developing new detailed
peer review standards and
procedures, to conduct a
pilot program during the
2001-2002 peer review
season on selected large and
small firms. The largest firms
were identified, at least
initially, as the 12 firms with
100 or more accounting and
auditing professionals and
30 or more SEC audit
clients. Those 12 firms were
designated as “Tier B” firms.
Subsequently, two SECPS
member firms merged and,
as a combined firm, met the
criteria for Tier B, increasing
the number to 13.
The disproportionately large
number of peer reviews of
the larger firms scheduled
for the 2001-2002 peer
review year made it espe-
cially difficult to perform
expanded oversight of the
peer review process in an
effective manner. In order to
implement the recommenda-
tions of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness and the Peer
Review Process Task Force
and effectively monitor the
results, the PRC decided,
with the concurrence of the
SECPS Executive Commit-
tee, to change the peer
review cycle of four large
firms (none of which is a Big
5 firm). The peer reviews of
three of them were deferred
to 2002 or 2003, and the
peer review of the fourth
was deferred from 2002 to
2003.
On July 20, 2001 the Chair
of the PRC wrote to the
Chief Accountant of the SEC
and the Managing Director,
Financial Management and
Assurance, of the U.S.
General Accounting Office,
informing them of the
decision to defer the four
firms’ peer reviews. Those
agencies also were informed
that each of those firms
would have its peer reviewer
perform and publicly report
on a review of the design of
the firm’s system of quality
control for its accounting
and auditing practice and on
the firm’s policies and
procedures related to the
SECPS membership require-
ments. Copies of the letter
were sent to other regulatory
bodies, such as the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Rural Utilities
Service, and the state boards
of accountancy. Also on July
20, 2001, the POB’s Chair
wrote the same parties
informing them that the
Board concurred with the
SECPS’s decision to defer
the triennial peer reviews of
the four large firms.
Full Scope Reviews. Full scope
triennial peer reviews were
conducted on five Tier B
firms during the 2001-2002
peer review year (Arthur
Andersen LLP, Ernst &
Young LLP, McGladrey &
Pullen LLP, Crowe Chizek
and Company, and Richard
A. Eisner LLP). Under the
active oversight of the POB,
the PRC completed guidance
to be pilot-tested for these
firms and a sample of other
firms. Peer reviewers used
that guidance on a sample of
engagements. They also
conducted focus group
sessions of seniors and
managers within the offices
reviewed and increased their
interviews of engagement
staff whose audits were
being reviewed. The reviews
of the three largest firms are
discussed below.
Andersen Peer Review. Less
than a week before the
scheduled exit conference
for Deloitte & Touche’s peer
review of Andersen, one of
Andersen’s largest clients,
Enron, announced that it
would be restating its
audited financial statements
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for the prior four years and
the unaudited financial
statements for the first two
quarters of 2001. Shortly
thereafter, Andersen was
named as a defendant in
litigation alleging, among
other things, deficiencies in
its audits of those financial
statements. In connection
with D&T’s reassessment of
the scope of its peer review
prior to concluding on the
review, D&T obtained
information related to the
restatement and the litiga-
tion, and determined that it
would perform additional
review procedures.
Andersen also requested that
D&T perform additional
work.
The additional procedures
included reviewing a sample
of audit engagements in
Andersen’s Houston office,
which was primarily respon-
sible for the Enron audit and
which had not been previ-
ously selected for review.
The additional procedures
also included specifically
reviewing Andersen’s
policies, guidance materials,
training programs, and
practice aids with respect to
those areas that had been
identified in the restate-
ments, namely, special
purpose entities, issuance of
equity instruments (e.g.,
shares, warrants, and rights)
for receivables, energy
trading contracts, related
party transactions, and
waived adjustments. D&T
also reviewed those areas on
a sample of engagements in
the office primarily respon-
sible for the Enron audit and
in three other offices. The
additional procedures did
not include reviewing
Andersen’s audits of Enron,
since engagements for
which there is pending
litigation are typically
excluded from a peer review
under the SECPS’s standards
for performing peer reviews.
In the near future, however,
the QCIC will be consider-
ing Andersen’s audits of
Enron.
The POB staff extended its
oversight on this peer
review, devoting about 700
hours to overseeing this peer
review on a real-time basis,
including extensive over-
sight of the additional review
procedures described above.
The staff’s procedures
included reviewing D&T’s
planning for the peer review
and its working papers,
findings, and analyses of
those findings; visiting a
majority of the offices that
D&T reviewed while the
reviews were in process;
attending numerous meet-
ings involving D&T and
Andersen personnel; being
consulted during the devel-
opment of D&T’s report and
letter of comments; and
attending, along with a
member of the POB, the
overall exit conference with
Andersen’s senior manage-
ment and the exit conference
for the Houston office.
Based on its oversight
procedures and analyses of
D&T’s findings, the staff
concurred with D&T’s
decision to issue an unmodi-
fied peer review report and
with the contents of D&T’s
letter of comments and
Andersen’s response to that
letter. These documents are
available on the AICPA web
site.
Ernst & Young LLP Peer
Review. The POB staff
devoted over 400 hours to
overseeing KPMG LLP’s
peer review of E&Y’s
quality controls. The staff
participated in this review
from initial planning through
final analysis of the peer
review findings and devel-
opment of the report, letter
of comments, and exit
conference agenda. The staff
had extensive field oversight
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involvement, monitoring
KPMG’s peer review at one-
half of the offices that were
peer reviewed. The Board’s
chairman participated with
the staff in evaluating the
peer review findings and
KPMG’s reporting decisions
and communicating several
suggestions to KPMG
relating to the letter of
comments before the final
exit conference at which
KPMG reported its peer
review findings to E&Y firm
management. The POB
chair, another member, and
staff actively participated in
the exit conference. The
unmodified peer review
report, the letter of com-
ments and the firm’s letter of
response are available on the
AICPA web site.
McGladrey & Pullen LLP
Peer Review. The E&Y peer
review of McGladrey &
Pullen resulted in the issu-
ance of a modified report
because of “instances in
certain recently merged
practices where pre-issuance
reviews should have been
more comprehensive.” This
condition resulted in certain
engagements (not involving
SEC registrants, insured
financial institutions, or
audits performed under
Government Auditing
Standards) not complying
with professional standards,
as well as instances of non-
compliance with the Firm’s
policies and procedures in
several quality control areas.
The POB staff devoted about
300 hours to overseeing this
peer review, from the
planning phase through the
reporting phase. The staff
reviewed E&Y’s planning
for the review, attended the
Webcast training program
for reviewers, reviewed the
findings and the summariza-
tions and analyses of those
findings, visited several of
the reviewed offices while
the reviews were in progress,
attended meetings with
engagement personnel and
focus group sessions with
professional staff, attended
meetings with M&P and
E&Y personnel and Peer
Review Committee task
forces to consider the
appropriateness of the
report, and participated,
along with the POB Vice
Chairman, in a telephonic
exit conference with
McGladrey’s senior manage-
ment. The modified peer
review report and the firm’s
letter of response are avail-
able on the AICPA web site.
Design Reviews and Specified
Annual Procedures Reviews.
The four Tier B firms that
had their full scope triennial
reviews deferred (BDO
Seidman LLP, BKD LLP,
Grant Thornton LLP, and
Moss Adams LLP) under-
went design reviews during
the 2001-2002 peer review
year. All received an un-
modified peer review report
without a letter of comments.
The reports are available on
the AICPA web site.
The PRC developed a set of
specified annual procedures
for all Tier B firms not
undergoing a full scope
triennial peer review or a
design review during the
2001-2002 year. However,
while substantially all of the
review procedures were
applied to the four firms
(PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP,
KPMG LLP, and J. H. Cohn
LLP), none of the reviews
was completed or reported
upon. (See “Efforts to
Enhance Peer Review”
elsewhere in this report.)
The POB staff performed
extensive oversight over the
design reviews and specified
annual procedures reviews.
The oversight procedures
included reviewing the
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standing of the review
findings and to test the
comprehensiveness of the
reviewers’ work. Twenty of
the firms visited had more
than five SEC clients, three
had received modified or
adverse reports on their
previous peer review, and
eleven were undergoing
their initial review. The
Board’s staff visited and
participated in the reviews of
41% of the firms with more
than five SEC clients, 21%
of the firms with SEC clients
that received modified
reports during their previous
peer review, and 26% of the
firms undergoing their initial
peer review.
In addition to the on-site
visits, the Board’s staff
reviewed the peer review
reports and all the underly-
ing working papers for
reviews of 99 firms. The
staff discussed significant
issues and findings with the
review team, determined
whether the reviewers had
the industry and regulatory
qualifications to perform the
review, and obtained expla-
nations and clarifications of
matters regarding the scope
of the review, the signifi-
cance of systemic and
engagement findings, and
the consistency of findings
in the peer review reports.
The Board’s staff concluded
that all significant matters
were properly addressed,
resolved, and reported on in
accordance with the peer
review standards.
For the 221 firms (of which
112 have SEC clients) not
subject to the more intensive
visitation and working paper
review oversight programs,
the POB staff performed a
review that was limited to
reading the peer review
reports and selected working
papers. In those instances,
the SECPS staff performed
either an on-site visit or a
detailed review of the peer
review reports and working
papers. The SECPS staff
performed a more limited
review of the peer review
reports and working papers
for the peer reviews on
which the POB staff per-
formed either an on-site visit
or a working paper review.
2001-2002 peer review year
For the 2001-2002 peer
review year, the Board’s staff
is currently overseeing the
peer reviews of 398 firms
(13 Tier B firms and 385
smaller firms) and expects to
oversee 12 additional
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planning for each of the
reviews, the reviewers’
working papers, findings,
and analyses of those
findings; visiting an office of
the reviewed firm while the
reviewers were observing
and testing the firm’s moni-
toring procedures; and, for
the design reviews, review-
ing the reports issued and
attending the overall exit
conference with the firm’s
senior management.
Oversight of the Other Firms’
Peer Reviews
2000-2001 peer review year
During the 2000-2001 peer
review year, the Board’s staff
directly participated, through
on-site visits, in the reviews
of 48 other firms with SEC
clients. During those visits,
the staff reviewed the peer
review working papers,
evaluated the qualifications
of the reviewers, reviewed
the scope and findings with
the review team, and partici-
pated in the final exit
conference with representa-
tives of the reviewed firm.
Also, the staff often re-
viewed clients’ financial
statements and the auditors’
supporting working papers
to obtain a better under-
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2001 peer review year that
were subject to such actions
have agreed to accept all the
remedial corrective actions
requested by the Committee.
Table I summarizes Commit-
tee-imposed corrective
actions.
The PRC and ETF have
considered and processed all
368 of the 2000-2001 peer
reviews and as of March 31,
2002, 284 of the anticipated
410 2001-2002 peer re-
views.
The PRC met four times in
2000-2001 and nine times in
2001-2002. A Board mem-
ber, staff member, or both
participated in each of those
meetings. The ETF met 24
times to consider the 2000-
2001 peer review reports,
and through March 31,
2002, 19 times to consider
the 2001-2002 peer review
reports; the Board’s staff
participated in all of those
meetings.
Sanctions Imposed on a
Member Firm
One member firm, Harold Y.
Spector, CPA, received an
adverse report on its 1999
peer review. The PRC
accepted the adverse report
with the understanding that
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reviews of Tier A firms that
have not yet been per-
formed. The staff partici-
pated in on-site oversight of
50 of the smaller firms, is
reviewing the peer review
reports and working papers
for 102 firms, and is per-
forming a more limited
review of the peer review
reports and working papers
for the remaining 233 firms
(of which 98 have SEC
clients).
PRC’s Consideration of Peer
Review Reports and
Imposition and Monitoring of
Corrective Actions
After either the Board’s staff
or the SECPS staff reviews a
peer review, the report is
presented to either the entire
PRC or the Evaluations Task
Force (ETF) of the PRC. The
ETF meets once or twice a
month to consider and
accept the individual peer
review reports. Because of
the high public interest in
firms with many SEC clients,
reports on firms with 30 or
more SEC clients are consid-
ered and accepted by the
entire PRC. During those
meetings, the Board and
SECPS staffs participate in
the discussions and commu-
nicate significant matters that
arose in the course of their
oversight. Once the ETF or
the PRC accepts the reports,
they are placed in the public
files at the AICPA and on the
AICPA web site.
As part of its processing of
peer review reports, the PRC
and ETF consider whether
the findings warrant addi-
tional follow-up to assure
that the public interest is
properly protected and the
firm is taking appropriate
corrective actions to address
its peer review findings.
When the PRC concludes
that the corrective actions
proposed by a reviewed firm
in response to the peer
review findings are not
adequate or that similar
deficiencies have occurred
on successive peer reviews,
the committee usually
requests that the reviewed
firm implement additional
specific corrective actions.
In addition, if the design or
compliance deficiencies are
particularly severe, the PRC
may ask the firm to demon-
strate that the corrective
actions have been imple-
mented to the satisfaction of
the review team captain or
another outside party. The
firms reviewed in the 2000-
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the firm had agreed to
certain remedial actions.
Those actions were not
taken, and as a result the
committee recommended to
the SECPS Executive
Committee that the firm be
sanctioned. On December
17, 2001 a Hearing Panel of
the SECPS Executive
Committee voted to expel
the firm from the Section,
and to report that expulsion
in The CPA Letter. On
February 8, 2002 an Appeal
Panel upheld the decision of
the Hearing Panel.
SEC Oversight of Peer
Reviews
Since 1982, the SECPS and
the Board have had a formal
“Memorandum of Under-
standing” with the SEC that
provides it with access to the
peer review process and the
POB staff’s oversight
procedures. The purpose of
SEC oversight, as described
in the Memorandum, is to
enable the SEC staff to make
its own independent evalua-
tion of the peer review
standards, the effectiveness
of the application of those
standards in assuring the
quality of audits performed
by those who practice before
the SEC, and the effective-
ness of the POB’s monitor-
ing and oversight of the peer
review program. For the
2000-2001 peer review year,
the SEC staff visited the
Board’s offices and re-
viewed the peer review
reports, peer review working
papers, and Board oversight
files on the reviews of 38
firms. The SEC staff also
reviewed the Board’s
oversight files on the re-
views of an additional 52
firms.
In January 2002 the SEC
published its Annual Report
for the year ended Septem-
ber 30, 2001, which dis-
cussed the SEC staff’s
oversight of the SECPS peer
review process and the POB
oversight process. As was
the case with the SEC’s 2000
Annual Report and unlike in
certain prior years, the SEC’s
2001 Annual Report did not
provide an evaluation of
whether the profession’s
peer review process is an
effective means of improv-
ing the quality control
systems of member firms.
Summary and Conclusions
The Board believes that the
peer review process contin-
ues to contribute to improve-
ments in the quality control
systems of member firms
and to the quality of auditing
performed in the United
States. The report of the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness
contained many recommen-
dations to improve the
effectiveness of peer re-
views. Unfortunately, some
of the major recommenda-
tions have not been acted
upon and others have been
rejected. By way of ex-
ample, the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness recommended
that the SECPS should
“[m]ake clear to peer review
team captains and reviewers
that the POB, not the firm
being reviewed, is the
primary client. Peer reviews
are performed to enhance
the public’s confidence in
independent auditors; the
POB, as the public’s repre-
sentative, should be viewed
as the principal stakeholder
in this process.” (Section
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6.40 of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness Report and
Recommendations dated
August 31, 2000 at page
148.) The PRC rejected the
Panel’s recommendation
saying that the PRC, not the
POB, is responsible for
maintaining and administer-
ing the peer review program.
The PRC did adopt a related
Peer Review Process Task
Force recommendation to
address the peer review
reports to both the PRC and
the reviewed firm, but did
not adopt the recommenda-
tion of the Panel that the
POB be the primary client of
peer review.
In its White Paper, the POB
recommended that firm-on-
firm peer review be discon-
tinued for firms that audit
more than 100 public
corporations each year. In its
place, employees of the
proposed IIA would conduct
thorough and comprehen-
sive yearly reviews of such
firms.
The Panel on Audit Effec-
tiveness recommended that
the POB and its staff expand
their oversight throughout
the reviews of the largest
firms by attending important
meetings and interviews
with firm personnel and by
reviewing draft peer review
reports before they are
provided to others. Notwith-
standing the increased
involvement that the POB
and its staff had in their
oversight of the reviews of
the largest firms, there were
occasions when discussions
of the preliminary engage-
ment findings between the
reviewers and engagement
personnel preceded POB
staff involvement. In addi-
tion, the drafts of some
reports were discussed with
the reviewed firms before
they were provided to the
POB.
Table I–Major Corrective Actions Imposed by
the Peer Review Committee to Ensure that
Quality Control Deficiencies are Corrected
Number of Actions
12 Months Since
Ended Inception
Action 6/30/01  (1978)
Accelerated peer review 1 55
Employment of an outside consultant to perform
preissuance reviews of financial statements or other
specified procedures 19 137
Oversight by the peer reviewers or by a
Peer Review Committee member to monitor progress
made by the firm in implementing corrective actions 17 251
Oversight of the firm’s internal monitoring program 38 476
Changes made in the firm’s quality control document or
other guidance materials 7 51
Continuing professional education in specified areas 21 92*
* Since July 1, 1988, as data for prior years are no longer available.
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Quality
Control
Inquiry
Process
The Quality Control Inquiry
Committee ascertains whether
allegations of audit failures
against member firms involving
SEC registrants and certain
other entities indicate (a) a need
for the respective firms to take
specific corrective actions to
improve their quality control
systems, or (b) profession-wide
issues that need to be addressed.
The QCIC’s inquiry is suffi-
ciently detailed to determine
whether there are possible
performance issues that the
reporting firms need to address.
The quality control inquiry
process is critical to the
profession’s self-regulatory
program and is a necessary
complement to the peer review
process.
Reporting of Cases
Member firms are required
to report to the QCIC, within
thirty days of service, all
litigation alleging deficien-
cies in the conduct of an
audit of the financial state-
ments of a SEC registrant.
Pursuant to its organizational
document, the QCIC also
may identify a significant
public interest in an alleged
audit failure that the member
firm is otherwise not re-
quired to report. The com-
mittee screens those alleged
failures, and if it determines
that the allegations indicate a
possible need for corrective
measures by the member
firm, the QCIC requests the
member firm to voluntarily
report the case. If a member
firm refuses to do so, the
SECPS Executive Commit-
tee determines whether the
case should be added to the
QCIC’s agenda.
This section reports on cases
reported to and acted upon
by QCIC from July 1, 2000
through March 31, 2002.
During that period, the
committee screened two
cases that would otherwise
not have been required to be
reported. One involved
litigation by the FDIC
against a member firm
alleging an audit failure in
the audit of a bank. The
other involved litigation
brought by a state attorney
general against a member
firm alleging an audit failure
in the audit of a large not-
for-profit entity. Both firms
voluntarily reported the
cases.
Oversight of the Quality
Control Inquiry Process
The Board and its staff have
access to the QCIC process
and actively participate in
the discussion of the impli-
cations of the allegations in
each case that takes place at
meetings of the committee.
For each case, the POB staff
reviews the complaints
submitted by the member
firm, SEC Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement
Releases against company
personnel and accountants,
relevant financial statements
and regulatory filings, and
other publicly available
documents. The Board’s
staff participated in virtually
all QCIC task force meetings
(99) with member firms
during the period covered
by this report. The informa-
tion obtained from participa-
tion at those meetings and
from reading the aforemen-
tioned documents serves as
the basis for a comprehen-
sive report prepared by the
POB staff on each case,
which is discussed at a
Board meeting.
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QCIC Activity
The QCIC began the period
with 51 cases on its agenda.
Ninety-six new cases were
opened during the period,
and 95 cases were closed. At
March 31, 2002 there were
52 open cases.
As part of its initial analysis
of each case reported by a
member firm, the QCIC
reviews the complaints,
applicable financial state-
ments and regulatory filings,
and other relevant public
documents. During the
period, the QCIC determined
that there were no quality
control or personnel issues
to pursue on 7 cases and
closed them after its initial
analysis.
For the other 88 cases that
were closed, the QCIC task
forces met with firm repre-
sentatives to gain an under-
standing of the work per-
formed in the areas of
alleged audit failure and the
potential implications for the
firm’s quality control poli-
cies and procedures. Where
appropriate, the QCIC task
forces reviewed firm guid-
ance materials and, on
occasion, selected engage-
ment working papers
relevant to particular allega-
tions.
Cooperation of Firms
with the QCIC
The QCIC monitors the
timeliness with which
member firms report cases to
the committee. During the
period, one Big 5 firm
reported a number of cases
late. Senior management of
the firm was informed, and
they have subsequently
advised the committee that
the firm’s procedures for
reporting complaints have
been revised to ensure future
timely reporting.
The committee advised
another Big 5 firm that its
personnel were not suffi-
ciently prepared to respond
to the committee’s inquiries,
and as a result it was neces-
sary to have more than one
meeting for a number of that
firm’s cases. The firm’s
general counsel was in-
formed and a liaison audit
partner met with the QCIC
and POB staffs in an effort to
understand the committee’s
concerns. It appears that this
firm is working to improve
its communications with
QCIC’s task forces.
Enron
As noted earlier under “POB
Actions Relating To Enron
Collapse,” the Board wrote
to the QCIC requesting that
it review the performance of
Andersen, the audit partners,
and other senior members of
the audit engagement team
on Enron as soon as possible
to determine if the facts
indicate deficiencies in
Andersen’s system of quality
controls or its performance
on the audits. The POB
suggested that particular
attention be given to off-
balance sheet financing and
energy trading contracts,
among other matters. The
Board also requested that the
QCIC inquire about discus-
sions between Andersen and
Enron’s audit committee
concerning Andersen’s
evaluation of the critical
accounting policies used in
Enron’s financial statements
and the implications for
auditor independence of the
non-audit services provided
to the company.
The QCIC has assigned a
task force to the case, one
member of which partici-
pated in the firm-wide exit
conference for Andersen’s
2001 peer review in Decem-
ber 2001, at which D&T
reported the results of its
expanded peer review to
Andersen management. The
QCIC also has forwarded the
Board’s letter to Andersen.
The QCIC staff has analyzed
the allegations in the many
complaints filed to date
alleging audit failure. A
meeting with Andersen
representatives is planned
for a future date.
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The QCIC considered a case
in which the registrant
changed its method of
evaluating certain reserves
and recorded a significant
increase in those reserves.
The auditor concluded that
this was a change in estimate
that did not require an
explanatory paragraph in its
report. The committee
questioned whether the
report should have had an
explanatory paragraph
disclosing a change in
accounting principle insepa-
rable from a change in
estimate. The QCIC con-
ducted a survey of the Big
Five firms and only one
would have included an
explanatory paragraph in its
report. Consequently, the
QCIC asked the ASB to
consider this issue. The ASB
plans to do so.
The committee noted that
additional audit guidance
also is needed in the area of
alternative procedures to the
confirmation of receivables
arising from the sale of
software licenses, when
confirmations are not
received from customers or
distributors. For example, an
alternative procedure
typically applied is the
examination of shipping
documents; however,
shipping documents do not
exist for the sale of software
licenses. The QCIC plans to
discuss this matter with the
chair of the ASB at its May
2002 meeting.
The QCIC noted a lack of
uniformity among firms in
identifying and communicat-
ing certain internal control
matters that are defined in
the professional literature as
“reportable conditions.” The
QCIC also plans to discuss
this matter with the ASB
chair.
The QCIC believes that
additional guidance is
necessary for auditors
performing interim reviews
in situations where a client’s
internal control system is
weak and, accordingly,
plans to ask the ASB to give
consideration to this issue
during its re-evaluation of
SAS 71, Interim Financial
Information.
Consultation with Industry
Specialists
The Panel on Audit Effec-
tiveness recommended that
the QCIC establish a panel
of industry specialists and
experts, whose members
would be drawn from the
profession and industry, to
consult with it as required.
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Communications with
Standards Setters
and the PITF
The Panel on Audit Effec-
tiveness recommended that
the QCIC bring its consider-
able experience to bear in
assisting the Auditing
Standards Board in improv-
ing auditing standards and
other guidance to auditors
regarding fraud detection.
The QCIC formed a task
force that met with the ASB’s
Fraud Task Force as it
prepared the Exposure Draft
of a proposed Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS),
Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit,
which is discussed else-
where in this report. The
chair of the ASB’s Fraud
Task Force also met with the
QCIC to discuss proposed
procedures to facilitate the
detection of fraud by
auditors.
At the QCIC’s February
2002 meeting, the commit-
tee decided that the QCIC
task force should comment
on the Exposure Draft. The
ASB Chair plans to attend
the QCIC’s May 2002
meeting to discuss this and
other matters.
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Statistical Summary of
Closed Case Questionnaires
The QCIC has established a
database of information
about litigation and enforce-
ment actions against auditors
to identify problem areas
and trends. The database
includes information on all
cases closed since 1999 and,
to the extent information is
available, on other cases
closed since December
1997. It does not identify
either the registrant or the
auditor.
A report, QCIC Summary of
Closed Case Questionnaires,
which summarizes informa-
tion on 177 cases, was
distributed to all SECPS
member firms. In 57 cases,
the QCIC recommended that
the Ethics Division either
open an investigation or
evaluate whether to open
one. The QCIC noted
indications of management
fraud in 65 cases; neverthe-
less, in 34 of these cases, the
committee questioned the
adequacy of the auditors’
performance.
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Each QCIC member com-
pletes a form indicating his
or her industry and func-
tional knowledge. This
inventory is used as the basis
for assigning members to
cases and for identifying
members who might serve
as consultation resources.
In addition, the QCIC looks
to the largest firms to
provide consultation on
industry or functional (e.g.,
derivative valuation) issues.
The committee concluded
that the consultation knowl-
edge the QCIC needs can be
found within the firms.
Referral of Individuals to the
Professional Ethics Division
In 1998 the QCIC and the
Professional Ethics Division
developed a Memorandum
of Understanding to avoid
duplication of efforts and to
streamline the ethics process.
Prior to the Memorandum,
the Ethics Division opened
an investigation in the
majority of cases that QCIC
closed. The 1998 agreement
between the two committees
was designed to focus the
Ethics Division’s efforts by
categorizing each case the
QCIC closes into one of four
categories, ranging from
frivolous with a recommen-
dation for no action by the
Division with respect to
engagement personnel to an
explicit recommendation
that the Division open an
investigation.
Since July 1, 2000, the
QCIC informed the Division
of 16 cases in which it
believed there may be
significant engagement
personnel issues and recom-
mended that the Division
determine whether or not to
open an investigation. The
Division has reviewed all of
these cases and decided to
open investigations in 15 of
them. In addition, the QCIC
recommended to the Divi-
sion that an investigation be
initiated in 12 other cases;
the Division opened investi-
gations for each of those
cases.
The QCIC also becomes
aware of CPAs who are
employed by companies that
are audited by member firms
and whose behavior may
warrant investigation. During
the period, the QCIC re-
ferred 19 such CPAs,
principally chief financial
officers and other account-
ing officers, to the Ethics
Division, which opened
cases on those individuals
who were AICPA members.
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Registrants in the computer
hardware and software
industry and other high-tech
companies represented 30%
of the cases. Other observa-
tions included: (1) 60% of
the cases involved compa-
nies with revenue of less
than $200 million, (2) 40%
of the cases involved
companies whose initial
public offering was within
the three years preceding the
litigation, (3) 36% of the
cases involved restated
financial statements, and (4)
18% involved a change in
auditors during the three
years prior to the period
covered by the complaint.
Implementation of New
Self-Disciplinary Membership
Requirement
A new self-disciplinary
membership requirement
was implemented for cases
reported to the QCIC after
January 1, 2001. When the
QCIC has concerns about
the performance of indi-
vidual auditors, it refers the
case to the Professional
Ethics Division to determine
whether or not individual
performance-specific issues
warrant investigation. The
Division defers its investiga-
tion, however, until all
litigation is concluded, with
deferral often extending
several years. The new
requirement is designed to
protect the public from
possible substandard perfor-
mance during the period
between the referral to the
Division and the conclusion
of the Division’s investiga-
tion.
Once the deferral takes
place, the member firm must
select one of three options
with respect to the audit
engagement partner (and
sometimes other members of
the engagement team). The
implementation of the option
the member firm selects is
subject to review during the
member firm’s peer review
and by the POB. The options
are:
n Terminate or retire the
individual from the member
firm.
n Remove the individual from
performing or supervising
audits of public companies
until the Division’s ethics
enforcement process is
complete.
n Subject the individual to
additional oversight on all
audits of public companies
in which the individual is
involved.
Since January 1, 2001, the
effective date of the new
membership requirement,
the QCIC closed 23 cases, of
which three were subject to
the requirement, and the
Division decided to investi-
gate them at the suggestion
of the QCIC. One firm has
elected the second option
and another firm has elected
the third option. The firm
involved in the third case has
not yet elected an option;
however, the engagement
partners on the audit in
question are not presently
serving as engagement
partners.
This new membership
requirement has increased
significantly the importance
of the QCIC’s evaluation of
the performance of person-
nel involved in alleged audit
failures. The Board supports
the QCIC’s role in the
disciplinary process, and
recognizes the potential
effects on the careers of
individual engagement
partners. The POB believes
that the committee has been
diligent in discharging this
new responsibility.
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Table II– QCIC Activity
Inception
 12 Months 9 Months (11/1/79)
ended ended through
6/30/01 3/31/02 3/31/02
Actions Related to Firms
Either a special review was made, the firm’s
regularly scheduled peer review was expanded,
or other relevant work was inspected  8  1  85
A firm took appropriate corrective measures
that were responsive to the implications of the
specific case 11 6  152
Actions Related to Standards
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked
to consider the need for changes in, or guidance on,
professional standards 1  3  54
The Professional Issues Task Force was asked to
consider the issuance of a Practice Alert 2 -  28
Actions Related to Individuals
Cases opened by the AICPA Professional Ethics
Division as a result of QCIC’s concern about the
performance of senior audit personnel 19 8  96
41 18 415
(Note: Frequently more than one action is taken by the QCIC or by the firm on an individual case.)
SEC Access to the QCIC
Process
As part of its responsibilities
for oversight of the account-
ing profession, the SEC
actively monitors the QCIC
process. After each QCIC
meeting, the SEC staff visits
the POB’s offices to review
the SECPS’s and the POB’s
closed-case files and to
discuss them with the QCIC
and POB staffs. The Chief
Accountant of the SEC
participated in a recent SEC
oversight visit and has been
invited to attend a portion of
the QCIC’s May 2002
meeting.
Summary and Conclusions
The Board believes that the
QCIC process is functioning
as designed and effectively
complements the peer
review process. The Board
believes the recent revisions
to the self-disciplinary
process are in the public
interest and commends the
QCIC for the work they
have done this year. The
QCIC process is valuable in
identifying needed improve-
ments to the firms’ quality
control systems and areas
where the profession would
benefit from additional
standards or guidance.
We note that the QCIC does
not meet with the individuals
who conducted the allegedly
deficient audit, and only
occasionally reviews work
papers. The committee’s
ratings are based largely on
the review of publicly
available information and
inquiries of firm personnel
who have reviewed the audit
(and other audits performed
by members of the engage-
ment team on the allegedly
deficient audit) so they can
respond to the committee’s
inquiries.
In its White Paper, the POB
has recommended that the
proposed IIA be given the
privilege of confidentiality
as well as the power of
subpoena to compel testi-
mony and produce docu-
ments. This would allow
investigators to interview
individuals who conducted
the allegedly deficient audit
and obtain relevant work
papers.
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The
Auditing
Standards
Board
P O B  R E P O R T S  O N
The Auditing Standards
Board promulgates auditing,
attestation, and quality
control standards to be
observed by members of the
AICPA in accordance with
its Bylaws and Code of
Professional Conduct. The
ASB is composed of 15
members, including repre-
sentatives from international,
national, regional, and local
firms, as well as representa-
tives from accounting
education and state govern-
ment. The POB’s Charter,
adopted in February 2001,
expanded the POB’s over-
sight authority to include the
ASB. This oversight in-
cludes:
n Consulting with the AICPA
Board of Directors on new
ASB member nominations
and concurrence with
nominations for the ASB
chair.
n Attending ASB meetings.
n Evaluating the implementa-
tion of ASB standards
through the peer review
process.
n Recommending issues for
consideration for inclusion
on the agenda of the ASB.
n Evaluating the effectiveness
of the ASB and the ad-
equacy of its resources.
POB Oversight of the ASB’s
Process of Setting Auditing
Standards
During 2001 the Board and
its staff initiated their over-
sight of the ASB. The POB’s
primary concern in its
oversight role is that the
process of setting auditing
standards is one that pro-
motes the public interest by
improving the way that
audits are performed and
increasing the reliability and
credibility of financial
statements.
A POB member reviewed
information about the
qualifications and experi-
ence of the five individuals
nominated in 2001 for
membership on the ASB and
consulted with the AICPA
about them. Members for the
ASB’s 2001-2002 year
include one representative
from each of the eight
largest accounting firms, five
from local or regional firms,
one from academia, and one
from government. The chair
continued in his second year
in that role.
A Board member and staff
attended all meetings of the
ASB and had the privilege
of the floor to comment and
raise questions. A staff
member also attended and
participated in selected
meetings of ASB task forces,
including the:
n Audit Issues Task Force,
whose activities include
overseeing the ASB’s
planning process.
n Fraud Task Force, which has
developed proposals for an
auditor’s consideration of
fraud in a financial state-
ment audit.
n SAS No. 71 Task Force,
which is revising standards
for reviews of interim
financial information.
A staff member also at-
tended liaison meetings of
the ASB with the SEC and
the FASB.
The ASB advises the POB of
its agenda and provides
copies of all documents to
be discussed at the meetings.
The POB has full access to
ASB members, including the
chair, as well as the AICPA
Audit and Attest Standards
staff to discuss draft docu-
ments and offer comments
and suggestions. The POB
also has the opportunity to
interact with the ASB
members and the AICPA
staff to aid in its evaluations.
We have reported separately
on the status of responses to
the recommendations of the
Panel on Audit Effective-
ness, many of which were
addressed to the ASB. The
ASB has devoted significant
attention to the recommen-
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dations and its agenda has
reflected responses to many
of them. Our oversight
includes monitoring the
ASB’s responses.
Enron
On January 17, 2002, the
Board communicated to the
chairs of both the QCIC and
the ASB issues requiring
their attention relating to
alleged deficiencies in the
audits of Enron’s financial
statements. (See “POB
Actions Related to Enron
Collapse” in this report for
further discussion of those
communications.)
New Standards
Since our oversight began,
the ASB has issued the
following new standards:
n SAS No. 94, The Effect of
Information Technology on
the Auditor’s Consideration
of Internal Control in a
Financial Statement Audit,
which expands existing
standards to provide
guidance to auditors about
the effects of information
technology on internal
control and the assessment
of control risk.
n SAS No. 95, Generally
Accepted Auditing Stan-
dards, which establishes a
hierarchy of auditing
literature by identifying the
body of literature and
clarifying the authority of its
various components, thereby
reducing uncertainty about
those publications with
which the auditor must
comply.
n SAS No. 96, Audit Documen-
tation, which replaces a prior
SAS on working papers with
more specific guidance and
requirements designed to
improve the quality of audit
documentation.
Proposed Fraud Standard
In February 2002 the ASB
issued an exposure draft of a
proposed SAS, Consider-
ation of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit. This
proposal would establish
standards and provide
guidance to auditors in
fulfilling their responsibilities
as they relate to fraud.
The proposed SAS, which
expands the current guid-
ance in SAS No. 82, is
intended to effect a substan-
tial change in auditors’
performance, thereby
improving the likelihood that
they will detect material
misstatements due to fraud.
The proposal increases the
focus on professional
skepticism. Auditors would
set aside any prior beliefs
they may have about
management’s honesty and
integrity when considering
the possibility of fraud, and
should not be satisfied with
audit evidence that is less
than persuasive because of a
belief that management is
honest.
Auditors would plan re-
sponses to identified risks of
material misstatement due to
fraud, which, in the audits of
most public companies,
would include revenue
recognition. Responding in
part to the risk of manage-
ment override of controls,
the proposal also specifies
other audit procedures that
would be applied in the audit
of every public company.
If adopted, the proposal
would be effective for audits
of financial statements for
periods beginning on or after
December 15, 2002.
Other Publications
Since the POB’s oversight
began, the ASB has issued
or reviewed a variety of
other documents issued by
the AICPA, including three
interpretations of the SASs,
two Statements of Position,
and four Audit Guides.
International Projects
The ASB has undertaken
several steps to help con-
verge national and interna-
tional auditing standards.
The ASB and the Interna-
tional Auditing Practices
Committee (IAPC) coordi-
nate their activities by
attending each other’s
meetings, forming joint
committees, and observing
and monitoring the activities
of each other’s task forces.
In January 2002 the ASB
issued an invitation to
comment on an IAPC
proposal for auditing fair
values, with the intent that
both organizations will issue
similar standards. The IAPC
also is monitoring closely
the progress of the ASB’s
proposed fraud standard.
A major effort is underway
to review and amend the
basic audit risk model, under
the direction of the Joint
Risk Assessments Task
Force, a combined effort of
the IAPC and the ASB. The
task force is reviewing the
auditor’s consideration of the
audit risk process, including
the necessary understanding
of the entity and its environ-
ment, the entity’s response to
risk, and how the auditor
should use risk assessments
in planning audit proce-
dures.
Summary and Conclusions
On the basis of our oversight
activities, we believe that (1)
the ASB operated effectively
in 2001, (2) the ASB mem-
bers had the appropriate
qualifications and performed
professionally and diligently,
and (3) the resources made
available to the ASB were
adequate.
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Introduction
On January 20, 2002, the Public Oversight Board (POB) - created in 1977 to oversee the voluntary
self-regulatory structure for the accounting profession in the United States - voted to terminate its
existence not later than March 31, 2002. For the POB, this action was taken as a matter of conscience
and principle.
In a report prepared for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in August 1980, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) pointed out that for a self-regulatory program for the accounting
profession to be successful, strong leadership from the POB is essential. The POB, wrote the SEC,
“should serve as the conscience and critic of the self-regulatory effort.” The POB’s charter makes it
clear that it is independent and the purpose of its oversight activities is “to represent the public
interest on all matters that may affect public confidence in the integrity, reliability and credibility of
the audit process.”
At the time the POB was created, there were concerns that it might not be the right solution. John C.
Burton, a distinguished professor of accounting at Columbia University and the chief accountant at
the SEC in 1977, warned in congressional testimony in 1978 that “it is highly doubtful that a part-
time group [POB] can either in fact or perception” provide an effective substitute for statutory
regulation.
Meanwhile, Harold M. Williams, who was chairman of the SEC at the time the current self-regulatory
system was being created in the late 1970s, warned in a speech in January 1978, that “[t]he effective-
ness and credibility of the Public Oversight Board depends on its independence, including its
willingness to be critical when called for and its ability to make public its conclusions, recommenda-
tions, and criticisms.” Chairman Williams also made the point that an effective POB could only be
effective “if it is not impeded in performing its functions and responsibilities.”
Following its decision to terminate, the POB decided to prepare this paper to outline its proposals to
create a new regulatory structure for the accounting profession. These proposals stem from the POB’s
extensive experience with the profession’s voluntary self-regulatory system, its knowledge of
problems that confront that system, and its insights on the need for change. The primary purpose of
this paper is to present the case for legislative action creating an independent regulatory organiza-
tion in the private sector.
The POB felt it would be helpful to provide a brief history of how the current regulatory structure
came into being; to discuss problems affecting the present regulatory structure; to provide the POB’s
views on enforcement, discipline, and several other issues facing the profession; and to discuss the
POB’s decision to terminate.
Executive Summary
Over the past two years, the POB has faced increasing obstacles that have impeded its ability to carry
out its oversight functions. As a consequence, the POB feels it must perform its role as “conscience
and critic” because events of recent months have demonstrated that the warnings of Dr. Burton and
Chairman Williams have come to pass.
Three events are noteworthy in how the POB has been frustrated in its ability to effectively carry out
its responsibilities.
n On May 3, 2000, the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) - an organization within the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) - took the unprecedented step of notifying the
POB that it would refuse to pay for special reviews of public accounting firms. The special
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reviews in question had been sought by the SEC to determine whether the firms had complied
with SEC and professional independence standards. The decision of the SECPS to deny funding
to the POB was a serious blow to independent oversight of the accounting profession. Melvin
Laird, the former congressman and Secretary of Defense, who served on the POB longer than any
other member, said that this was “the worst incident in my 17 years” on the POB.
n Following the decision to cut off funding of the POB’s special reviews requested by the SEC, the
largest accounting firms - the Big 5 - agreed with the SEC that the POB should instead conduct
more limited independence reviews of the large firms. Despite this agreement, the next 21 months
were marked by delay and lack of progress. The POB, in the end, was unable to conduct the
reviews.
n For years, the POB had carried out its oversight responsibilities under a set of bylaws adopted
after it was created in 1977. The POB felt that a formal charter would improve the independence
of the Board, and a charter was one of the primary recommendations in 2000 of the Panel on
Audit Effectiveness, created by the POB at the request of the SEC. However, objections from the
AICPA and the Big 5 caused negotiations to drag on for more than a year. Ultimately, a new
charter took effect in February 2001.
When the POB voted to terminate its existence, the lack of progress in connection with the indepen-
dence reviews and the frustrations that stemmed from the funding cut off and slow negotiations over
the new charter all played a role. But the precipitating factor was the decision of the SEC to develop
a new regulatory structure in private talks with the AICPA and the Big 5 firms, with no consultation
with the POB. The SEC did not consult with the POB even though the POB had been established by
the AICPA, in consultation with the SEC, to protect the public interest.
When the POB initially learned of these talks, it asked to be included in the process and was prom-
ised that it would be consulted. That consultation never took place. In the end, the POB was simply
informed - on the day of the announcement of the proposed new structure - that there was no contin-
ued role for the POB in this structure, rendering it a “lame duck.” The POB determined that it could
not effectively oversee the activities of the accounting profession under the circumstances, and that
it would mislead the public to appear to do so. Furthermore, the POB was concerned that if it were to
continue during an interim period before a new governance structure was in place, it would leave the
impression that the POB approved of the SEC proposal, which it did not. Thus, as a matter if prin-
ciple, it voted to terminate its existence.
The Public Oversight Board strongly believes that a new regulatory structure for the accounting
profession is essential and that, to be effective, it must be based on the foundation of federal legisla-
tion.
The Board recommends that Congress create a new Independent Institute of Accountancy - the IIA -
and center all regulation under its auspices. A seven-member board would run the Institute totally
independent of the AICPA, the Big 5, and other firms. The chair and vice chair would be full time
employees of the Institute; five other members would serve on a part time basis. All would be
appointed by a panel composed of the chair of the SEC, the chair of the Federal Reserve Board and
the Secretary of the Treasury. Once named, the chair of the IIA would join these three in naming other
members of the board. Members of the IIA board could be removed only by a two-thirds vote of the
board itself.
The SEC would have oversight of the IIA, and the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant would be the
liaison to the IIA.
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Important functions of the Institute would include:
n The IIA would exercise oversight for all standard setting for accounting, auditing, and indepen-
dence, and their interpretation. Accounting standards are just as important as auditing and
independence standards. For this reason, the POB believes the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) should be brought under the umbrella of the IIA, which would take responsibility
for its oversight and funding.
n Firm-on-firm peer review would be discontinued for firms that audit more than 100 public
corporations each year. In its place, IIA employees would conduct comprehensive and thorough
yearly reviews of the annual internal inspections of such firms. Unlike peer review, no activities
of a firm would be off limits to Institute reviewers and the process would produce informative
public reports. Substantial staff resources to conduct these reviews will be needed.
In addition to the reviews, IIA employees would conduct special reviews, when warranted. Similar
to those the SEC originally asked the POB to undertake, these reviews would take a systemic, in-
depth look at a firm’s systems, policies, procedures, and operations. If necessary, such special
reviews would delve into questions affecting the firm’s compliance with applicable professional
standards. As with the yearly reviews, reports of these special reviews would be public.
n An Office of Enforcement and Discipline within the IIA would have full authority to investigate
allegations of wrongdoing by public accounting firms and their personnel. The POB recommends
giving the IIA the privilege of confidentiality as well as the power of subpoena to compel
testimony and produce documents. Cases of alleged misconduct could be brought before hearing
examiners. When warranted, these examiners could recommend to the IIA board the imposition of
sanctions, ranging from fines to expulsion from the profession. Cases could be referred to the
Justice Department for possible prosecution, or to the SEC, state boards of accountancy, or other
agencies, as appropriate.
n Funding would be provided through fees imposed on public corporations in amounts sufficient to
cover the costs of the Institute. The POB strongly believes that the funding mechanism must be
beyond the reach of the profession to prevent it from withholding necessary funds, as it did in
May of 2000.
n The IIA would be charged with coordinating international liaison and overseeing continued
professional education for those in the profession.
Beyond these functions, the POB recommends that:
n With regard to non-audit services for audit clients, the POB recognizes that there has been
disagreement on restricting scope of services and that various models have been suggested for
what should be allowed and what should be excluded.
The POB strongly agrees with a point made in President Bush’s 10-point reform plan that “Inves-
tors should have complete confidence in the independence and integrity of companies’ auditors.”
The specifics on the President’s plan recognize the importance of prohibiting certain non-audit
services in order to safeguard auditor independence.
The POB takes note of a statement issued by the AICPA on February 1, 2002, in which it affirmed
that it “will not oppose federal legislation restricting the scope of services that accountants may
provide their public audit clients, specifically in information technology and internal audit
design and implementation.”
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Against this background, the POB proposes that SEC regulations concerning independence be
legislatively codified with appropriate revisions to update restrictions on scope of services
involving information technology and internal audit services as noted above. At the same time,
the POB believes such legislation should affirm that tax work not involving advocacy and attest
work by audit firms in connection with SEC registration and other SEC filings be allowed. The
POB also believes that small public businesses, to be defined by the SEC, should not be subject
to any restriction on non-audit services for audit clients. Further, with respect to non-public
corporations, it is the POB’s position that such corporations and the accounting firms that audit
them should not be subject to any restriction on non-audit services. We expressly emphasize this
to avoid misunderstanding and any consequences to small business and small audit firms.
The IIA Office of Standards should be empowered by legislation to promulgate appropriate rules
affecting independence to cover changing circumstances.
The POB believes there should be no prohibition against an audit firm offering non-audit services
to non-audit clients.
n Auditors should be rotated every seven years. As a corollary, public corporations would be
prohibited from firing auditors during their term of service unless such action is determined by
the audit committee to be in the best interest of shareholders, with prompt notice to the IIA and
the SEC. Such action would be required to be publicly disclosed by corporations in current
reports and proxy statements filed with the SEC.
n Engagement and other partners who are associated with an audit should be prohibited from taking
employment with the affected firm until a two-year “cooling off” period has expired.
n The Institute should expand on the recommendations of the recent Blue Ribbon Committee
which made it clear that the external auditor should be accountable to a firm’s board of directors
and its audit committee and not to management. Specifically, the audit committee should take
full responsibility for hiring, evaluating, and - if necessary - terminating an audit firm.
n To discourage conflicts of interest involving public corporations, Congress should amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require more meaningful and timely disclosure of related
party transactions among officers, directors, or other affiliated persons and the public corporation.
Such disclosures should be made promptly in current reports as well as in proxy statements filed
with the SEC.
n Management of public corporations should be required to prepare an annual statement of
compliance with internal controls to be filed with the SEC. The corporation’s chief financial
officer and chief executive officer should sign this attestation and the auditor should review it.
An auditor’s review and report on the effectiveness of internal controls would - as the General
Accounting Office (GAO) found in a 1996 report - improve “the auditor’s ability to provide more
relevant and timely assurances on the quality of data beyond that contained in traditional
financial statements and disclosures.” Both the POB and the AICPA supported the recommenda-
tion when the GAO made it, but the SEC did not adopt it.
A Brief History of Self-Regulation
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 and Its Aftermath
The 1929 crash revealed a general absence of accounting and auditing standards, thereby permitting
public companies to report financial position and results of operations that sometimes bore little
relation to economic reality. The crash and ensuing depression led to congressional hearings, which
in turn led to several pieces of reform legislation, beginning with the Securities Act of 1933 and the
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, and the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act of 1940
followed. These acts require, or permit the SEC to require, as the SEC summarized in 1994, “that
financial statements filed with the Commission by public companies, investment companies, broker/
dealers, public utilities, investment advisors, and others, be certified (or audited) by independent
accountants.”
Although audits of public corporations were common before the federal securities acts of 1933 and
1934, they had not been required by statute. Beginning in April 1932, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) requested corporations applying for listing to agree to have their annual financial statements
audited by independent accountants.
The 1929 market crash revealed improper accounting practices at large public companies that had
become bankrupt. In 1939, the AICPA’s Committee on Accounting Procedure issued the first Ac-
counting Research Bulletin and the AICPA’s Committee on Auditing Procedure issued the first
Statement on Auditing Procedure. At present, accounting standards are issued by FASB, auditing
standards are issued by the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB), and interpretations of the Code
of Professional Conduct are issued by the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee - all of
which are private sector bodies.
The 1970s - Expansion of the Regulatory Structure
The major reforms of the 1930s and the regulatory system they created survived for more than 40
years with only minor modifications. That the regulation of the accounting profession remained
unchanged for so long may be attributed in part to the relatively few allegations of audit failures
during most of that period, at least in comparison with later years.
To this day, the responsibility for promulgating auditing and ethical standards resides within the
AICPA. The AICPA also was responsible for promulgating accounting standards until mid-1973
through its Committee on Accounting Procedure and its successor body, the Accounting Principles
Board. Both of those committees were comprised principally of practicing auditors, often those who
were responsible for their firms’ accounting policies. In 1973, responsibility for promulgating
accounting standards passed to FASB in the belief that the setting of accounting standards by an
independent body with no ties to either auditors or preparers of financial statements would enhance
the public’s confidence in the financial reporting process. At the same time, the Financial Accounting
Foundation was created to raise funds for FASB, among other tasks, and a Financial Accounting
Standards Advisory Council was created to advise FASB on its agenda and deliberations. That
structure remains largely unchanged today.
A series of cases involving alleged audit failures in the 1970s led the AICPA to create the Commis-
sion on Auditors’ Responsibilities, chaired by Manuel F. Cohen, a former chairman of the SEC. Those
cases involved fraudulent financial reporting and illegal or questionable corporate acts, such as
bribes, political payoffs, and kickbacks. The Cohen Commission’s Report, Conclusions, and Recom-
mendations issued in 1978 made numerous recommendations to improve audit practice in several
areas. Those recommendations led to the promulgation of Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS)
that increased the auditor’s responsibility to detect and report fraudulent financial reporting and
illegal acts by corporate management. Several other auditing standards can be traced either to Cohen
Commission recommendations or to specific audit failures and the litigation that they spawned.
The same cases that spawned the Cohen Commission also led to hearings by both the Senate and
House of Representatives in 1977 and 1978. In particular, the Senate’s Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting, and Management of the Committee on Government Operations (the Metcalf subcommit-
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tee) held hearings to determine whether additional governmental regulation of the accounting
profession was necessary or a system of professional self-regulation was sufficient.
In response to these hearings, the AICPA, in consultation with the SEC, created a voluntary self-
regulatory framework consisting of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the Division for CPA Firms,
with an independent POB to oversee the activities of the Practice Section and to monitor and
comment on matters that affect the public interest in the integrity of the audit process - a structure
that exists to this day. While no additional governmental regulation was imposed once the voluntary
self-regulatory system was created in the 1970s, Congress did pass the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) in 1977, following Senate hearings which revealed the payment of bribes by American
corporations to foreign officials. The FCPA made it clear that bribery of foreign officials by American
companies is an unacceptable and illegal practice. The act required SEC registrants to maintain a
system of internal accounting controls to provide reasonable assurance that certain objectives would
be achieved. For example, transactions must be executed consistent with management authorization
and be recorded to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles and to maintain accountability for assets. In addition, the FCPA required
public corporations to make and keep books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
fairly reflect underlying transactions.
The 1980s and 1990s - Congressional Hearings and Legislation
As noted in a September 1996 report of the GAO, The Accounting Profession - Major Issues: Progress
and Concerns, “In the 1980s, continued business failures, particularly those involving financial
institutions, led to a series of congressional hearings on auditing and financial reporting under the
federal securities laws.” Two major pieces of legislation resulted from those hearings: the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. While those laws increased responsibilities for auditors, they did not
address the regulatory structure of the accounting profession.
FDICIA added Section 36 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to provide early identification of
needed improvement in financial management at banks and savings and loan institutions.
Management’s responsibilities under regulations implementing Section 36, which apply to institu-
tions with total assets of $500 million or more, include reporting on management’s responsibility for
and assessment of the effectiveness of the institution’s internal controls over financial reporting.
Each institution is required to have an audit committee composed of outside directors independent
of management. Audit committees of institutions with $3 billion or more in assets must include
members with relevant banking or financial expertise, have access to their own outside counsel, and
exclude large customers. Under Section 36, the independent accountant must examine and report on
management’s assertions about the institution’s internal controls over financial reporting, using the
AICPA attestation standards. This requirement constitutes one of the few statutory or regulatory
requirements that independent auditors report publicly on client internal controls.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 addressed the concerns of Congress and
regulators about auditors’ responsibilities with respect to their clients’ compliance with laws and
regulations and about how instances of noncompliance were reported. Those concerns led to
inclusion in the act of a requirement that auditors of public companies notify the SEC of material
illegal acts when an entity’s management and board of directors have failed to take timely and
appropriate remedial action.
The 1996 GAO report, which was commissioned by Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.), the ranking
minority member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, identified five major issues
discussed in the various studies concerning the accounting profession from 1972 through 1995: (1)
auditor independence, (2) auditor responsibilities for fraud and internal controls, (3) audit quality, (4)
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the accounting and auditing standard-setting processes and the effectiveness of financial reporting,
and (5) the role of the auditor in the further enhancement of financial reporting.
The report summarized the results of these reviews as follows:
GAO’s analysis of the actions taken by the accounting profession in response to the major
issues raised by the many studies from 1972 through 1995 shows that the profession has been
responsive in making changes to improve financial reporting and auditing of public compa-
nies. Further, GAO’s analysis of statistical data on the results of peer reviews of accounting
firms that audit public companies registered with the SEC shows that most firms now have
effective quality control programs to ensure adherence with professional standards. How-
ever, GAO’s review of the studies’ findings shows that the actions of the accounting profes-
sion have not been totally effective in resolving several major issues. Issues remain about
auditor independence, auditor responsibility for detecting fraud and reporting on internal
controls, public participation in standard setting, the timeliness and relevancy of accounting
standards, and maintaining the independence of FASB.
While the profession and the SEC subsequently have addressed several of the issues that the GAO
review identified as being unresolved in 1996, a number of them, such as reporting on internal
controls, remain unresolved in 2002.
Changes in the Practice and Culture of Accounting Firms
The business model that describes the practice of the large accounting firms - a wide array of finan-
cial services performed both domestically and internationally for both audit clients and others - has
existed for many years.
Each of the large public accounting firms provide accounting and auditing services, tax services, and
management consulting services, and the largest firms provide those services globally through
overseas offices and foreign affiliates. These characteristics have existed for decades. As the Cohen
Commission noted in 1978:
Before independent audits became widespread in the United States, public accountants were
already performing a variety of other services. Public accountants in the early 1900s offered
advice on accounting systems, kept accounting records, prepared financial statements and
tax returns, and performed a variety of consulting services, including appraisals.
The Cohen Commission also noted that “large corporations typically operate at a number of different
locations. A public accounting firm must provide services at many places throughout the country and
the world.” The Panel on Audit Effectiveness, citing SEC data, noted in its 2000 report that:
the number of foreign companies that have registered securities in the United States has
almost tripled since 1990. . . . The securities of many U.S. companies registered with the SEC
are traded outside of the United States, and the financial statements of those companies may
be filed with non-U.S. regulators. The financial statements of many U.S. companies and
foreign companies are available to investors or creditors in numerous countries, irrespective
of the jurisdiction that regulates such companies.
While multi-faceted practices of the international accounting firms described above have existed for
many years, the extent to which non-audit services are provided to audit clients and the globaliza-
tion of the profession have changed over the years. Superimposed on the growth of non-audit
services and globalization is the high level of competition among the firms for audit clients in recent
years that many believe has changed the culture of auditing practice.
Certain non-audit services provided to audit clients - particularly the design and implementation of
large integrated information systems and internal audit and valuation services - have long raised
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concerns about both the fact and the appearance of auditor independence, and thus about the quality
of audits. The size of the fees from those services in many cases and their relationship to the amount
of audit fees from the same client has added to those concerns. Similar concerns about audit quality
are a natural result of a firm’s international practice in countries that do not have the same level of
accounting, auditing, and quality control standards as the United States. Lastly, some fear that
excessive competition for audit clients has driven audit fees down to a level that cannot support a
quality audit but that serves primarily to provide the firm with “a foot in the door” for marketing
other services.
Some have suggested that an increasing appetite for growth and profits is now driving the “culture”
and “tone” of most accounting firms. Accounting firms sometimes seem to view their clients - even
their audit clients - as “business partners.” There are also those who contend that audits are some-
times used as “loss leaders” to build a relationship with a client for the marketing of the accounting
firm’s non-audit services.
One can question whether, together with the natural reluctance to lose the audit fee, a diminished
professionalism makes it more difficult for a firm to reject a client’s proposed accounting treatment.
There seems to be little doubt that the forces described in this section as presenting challenges to
audit quality were present in several of the widely publicized recent business and audit failures. And
that, in turn, suggests the need for additional regulation of the profession and a degree of oversight
that significantly exceeds what exists at present.
The SEC’s 1998 and 2000 Initiatives
In a September 1998 speech at the New York University (NYU) Center for Law and Business, SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt noted that “qualified, committed, independent and tough-minded audit
committees represent the most reliable guardians of the public interest.” He announced that the
NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers had agreed to sponsor a “blue-ribbon”
panel to develop recommendations “to empower audit committees and function as the ultimate
guardian of investor interests and corporate accountability.” The committee’s report was issued in
February 1999.
The SEC responded with new disclosure rules in December 1999. Among them is the requirement
that a report by the audit committee be included in the company’s proxy statement, indicating
whether the audit committee has, among other things:
n reviewed and discussed the audited financial statements with management;
n discussed with the independent auditors the matters required to be discussed by auditing stan-
dards (which includes the quality of the accounting principles and underlying estimates reflected
in the financial statements); and
n discussed with the auditors their independence.
In addition, the SEC adopted a rule requiring that independent accountants review a company’s
interim financial information before the company’s quarterly report is filed.
The major stock exchanges also responded to the committee’s recommendations by enacting rules
covering the independence, qualifications, and composition of audit committees, including a
requirement that committee members be financially literate. The exchanges further required that the
audit committee adopt a formal written charter approved by the board of directors; the exchanges
also specified that the charter should contain minimum audit committee responsibilities.
Also in 1999, the Independence Standards Board (ISB) adopted Independence Standard No. 1,
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees. The standard requires that, at least annually, an
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auditor intending to be considered an independent accountant with respect to a specific entity under
the federal securities acts shall:
a. disclose to the audit committee of the company (or the board of directors if there is no audit
committee), in writing, all relationships between the auditor and its related entities and the
company and its related entities that in the auditor’s professional judgment may reasonably be
thought to bear on independence;
b. confirm in the letter that, in its professional judgment, it is independent of the company within
the meaning of the Acts; and
c. discuss the auditor’s independence with the audit committee.
In his 1998 NYU remarks, Chairman Levitt also proposed that “the Public Oversight Board form a
group of all the major constituencies to review the way audits are performed and assess the impact of
recent trends on the public interest.” In response, the POB formed the Panel on Audit Effectiveness.
Its report and recommendations, issued in August 2000, are discussed below.
In November 2000, the SEC adopted amendments to its auditor independence rules. These amend-
ments to the independence requirements placed limits on certain services, particularly information
technology and internal audit services, that accounting firms may provide to their audit clients
without impairing their independence. In those two areas in particular, the final independence rule
was not as restrictive as the rule originally proposed - it did not completely prohibit auditors from
providing them to their audit clients. In early 2002, in apparent response to concerns emanating from
the Enron collapse, the five largest accounting firms announced their intent to no longer provide any
internal audit or certain information technology services to their audit clients.
The release containing the SEC’s revised independence rules noted the risk of compromised indepen-
dence when a former partner, principal, stockholder, or professional employee of an accounting firm
is hired by an audit client of the firm. Accordingly, under the Commission’s final rule, as under the
then existing requirements, an auditor’s independence is impaired when such an individual is
employed in an accounting or financial oversight role at an audit client, unless certain conditions are
met. Both the SEC and the ISB considered the notion of a mandatory “cooling off” period before
accounting firm personnel join an audit client. Neither body adopted it because of concerns it would
unnecessarily restrict the employment opportunities of former firm professionals.
The POB’s Role in the Voluntary Regulatory Structure
As previously noted, the POB is a private sector body - independent of the accounting firms, the
AICPA, and the SEC - that was created in 1977 by the AICPA in consultation with the SEC for the
purpose of overseeing and reporting on the self-regulatory programs of the SECPS.
In addition to its ongoing monitoring and oversight responsibilities, the POB has undertaken or
commissioned special studies and reviews over the years. The reports emanating from them have had
a significant effect on regulation of the accounting profession and the quality of audits. The follow-
ing are examples of these reports:
n In the Public Interest: Issues Confronting the Accounting Profession, which contained recommen-
dations designed to enhance the usefulness and reliability of financial statements, strengthen the
performance and professionalism of auditors, and improve self-regulation (1993).
n Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor, which contained recommenda-
tions in the areas of auditor independence, involvement of audit committees and boards of
directors with independent auditors, litigation reform, and the relationships among the account-
ing profession, standard-setting bodies, and the SEC (1994).
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n Report and Recommendations of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, which is discussed below
(2000).
In addition to its ongoing oversight of the peer review and quality control inquiry processes, the
POB’s principal activities in 2001 and 2002 centered around monitoring the implementation of the
recommendations of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, overseeing the ASB, and preparing for the
reviews of the firms’ systems, procedures, and internal controls relating to independence, as dis-
cussed below. Over the past year, the POB has made significant additions to its full-time and part-
time staff to carry out expanded oversight and monitoring responsibilities called for in the new
charter.
The POB’s charter affirms that it is independent and specifies that the purpose of the POB’s oversight
activities is, as noted above, “to represent the public interest on all matters that may affect public
confidence in the integrity, reliability and credibility of the audit process.” The public interest is
represented by the quality, breadth, integrity, and stature of the members of the POB, which the
Board believes should serve as a model for the future membership of any successor oversight body.
The POB’s first chairman was John J. McCloy, former high commissioner for Germany who also
served his country in many other capacities over a long and distinguished career. He was followed by
Arthur Wood, former CEO and chairman of Sears, Roebuck & Co., and then by another distinguished
public servant, A. A. Sommer, a former SEC commissioner and securities lawyer. Other former board
members included Melvin R. Laird, former member of Congress and Secretary of Defense, who served
on the POB for 17 years, and Paul H. O’Neill, who resigned from the board to become Secretary of the
Treasury. The current Board consists of Charles A. Bowsher, former Comptroller General of the United
States, who was appointed to the Board in 1999 to serve as its chairman; Norman R. Augustine,
former chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin; Aulana L. Peters, former SEC commissioner; and
John H. Biggs, chairman and CEO of TIAA-CREF. Donald J. Kirk, former chairman of FASB, resigned
as vice chairman on January 18, 2002.
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness
As previously indicated, in October 1998, at the request of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, the POB
appointed the Panel on Audit Effectiveness to examine the way independent audits are performed
and to assess the effects of recent trends in auditing on the public interest. The panel issued its report
and recommendations on August 31, 2000. Its recommendations were addressed to many constituen-
cies - standard setters, accounting firms, the SECPS, audit committees, the SEC, and others - and
covered a wide range of matters, including:
n Conduct of audits, including the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud
(including earnings management when it constitutes fraud).
n Leadership and practices of audit firms.
n Effects on auditor independence of non-audit services provided to audit clients.
n Governance of the auditing profession.
n Strengthening the auditing profession internationally.
The panel’s report received widespread endorsement. SEC Chairman Levitt, for example, stated that
“[i]mplementation of the specific recommendations made by the [p]anel to improve the audit process
through more comprehensive and vigorous audit methodologies and standards will engender greater
confidence among investors that they are receiving high-quality audits.” He also commended the
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members of the panel “for their proposals to improve the self-regulatory framework of the profes-
sion.” POB Chairman Bowsher predicted that the report would play an important part in setting a
future course for the accounting profession.
No conclusions can yet be drawn about the extent to which the actions taken to date to implement
the panel’s recommendations have enhanced audit effectiveness. The panel’s report was published
less than two years ago, and the process of responding to the panel’s recommendations is incomplete.
Experience With Self-Regulation
The POB experience with self-regulation of the accounting profession has varied throughout the
period of its existence. For years, the profession and the AICPA were responsive to the POB and the
need to improve audits to enhance investor confidence in financial statements of public corpora-
tions.
The environment changed in recent years as accounting firms expanded greatly the scope of their
services which, in turn, led to a re-examination of the concept of independence by the SEC. During
the late 1990’s, the relationship between the accounting profession and the SEC became very
strained, with division among the Big 5 on whether to support or oppose the SEC.
During the same period, the relationship between the accounting profession and the POB also
became strained over the adoption of a charter for the POB, particularly with respect to the section in
the charter dealing with funding. In effect, the proposed POB charter became hostage to the dispute
among the accounting profession and the SEC over resolution of proposed revisions to the indepen-
dence requirements and rules. But, even during this period, several of the Big 5 supported the POB.
The relationship between the accounting profession and the POB was further strained when the POB,
at the SEC’s request, attempted to conduct reviews of the Big 5 firms’ policies, procedures and
internal controls related to independence. The SEC and the firms had agreed to these reviews, and
requested the POB to conduct such reviews and issue written reports on them. Some of the firms,
unfortunately, adopted an approach that resulted in delay and a lack of progress. This did not permit
the POB to conduct the reviews.
In the final analysis, the experience with voluntary self-regulation has been mixed in recent years.
The AICPA and several of the Big 5 firms, in the view of some, saw the POB’s role as one of a
“shield” for the profession rather than as an independent overseer.
Mr. Levitt, the former SEC chairman, also described this problem in testimony before the Senate
Banking Committee in February 2002. “More than three decades ago,” he said, “Leonard Spacek, a
visionary accounting industry leader, stated that the profession couldn’t ‘survive as a group, obtain-
ing the confidence of the public…unless as a profession we have a workable plan of self-regulation.’
Yet, all along the profession has resisted meaningful oversight.”
Problems with Current System of Self-Regulation
The current system of self-regulation of the accounting profession has significant problems.
First, the funding of the POB is subject to control by the firms through the SECPS, which in the past
has cut off that funding in an effort to restrict POB activities.
Second, the disciplinary system is not timely or effective. Disciplinary proceedings are deferred
while litigation or regulatory proceedings are in process. This results in years of delay and sanctions
have not been meaningful. The Professional Ethics Division of the AICPA, which handles disciplin-
ary matters against individuals, does not have adequate public representation on its Board. Investiga-
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tions by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee of the SECPS, which handles allegations of impro-
prieties in litigation against member firms arising out of audits of SEC clients, do not normally
include access to firm personnel and work papers. The disciplinary system does not include the
power to issue subpoenas or compel testimony. Thus, investigators must rely on the cooperation of
the individual being investigated. The QCIC has no access to the complaining party or the client
involved. Furthermore, there is no privilege or confidentiality protection for investigations or
disciplinary proceedings, and disciplinary actions are often not made public.
Another problem is that monitoring of firms’ accounting and auditing practices by the peer review
process has come to be viewed as ineffective, as either a diagnostic or remedial tool. More important,
the process has lost credibility because it is perceived as being “clubby” and not sufficiently
rigorous. Finally, the peer review team does not examine the work of an audit that is under investiga-
tion or in litigation.
Other problems include the fact that the current governance structure does not have the weight of a
congressional mandate behind it. There is also a perceived lack of candid and timely public report-
ing of why and how highly publicized audit failures and fraud occurred and what actions have or will
be taken to ensure that such problems do not recur.
Auditing Standards and Termination of the ISB
The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) was not subject to oversight by an independent entity until it
was put under the oversight of the POB in February 2001. In contrast, under the SEC’s proposed
governance structure for the accounting profession announced in January by SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt, there will be no oversight of the ASB other than by the profession’s trade association, the AICPA.
Most of the members of the ASB are associated with the eight largest public accounting firms.
The auditing standards promulgated by the ASB have not provided sufficiently specific and defini-
tive guidance, a weakness noted in the Panel on Audit Effectiveness Report and Recommendations
issued on August 31, 2000.
During a speech in January 1978, then-SEC Chairman Harold Williams stated, “The issue of indepen-
dence is the key one” for the accounting profession. The Independence Standards Board (ISB), which
was established in 1997, was terminated in July 2001 because both the AICPA and SEC, for different
reasons, did not agree with what the ISB had done. The ISB was established to create, codify, and
interpret independence standards for auditors of public companies. Its termination has left a signifi-
cant void.
The Public Oversight Board Charter
For more than two decades, the POB operated under a set of bylaws, but without the benefit of a
charter. Creation of a charter to provide expanded and greater assurances of POB independence
became a priority of the Board in December 1999, and was one of the key recommendations of the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, which issued its draft report in May of 2000 and its final report in
August of the same year. Yet it took over a year - from December 1999 to February 2001 - to negoti-
ate a new charter.
The primary reason for this delay was the resistance of the AICPA and the large firms to various
points. For example, the AICPA and accounting profession, contrary to the recommendation of the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, wanted limitations on POB funding. In addition, for many months they
opposed giving the POB authority to approve nominations for the chairs of the SECPS executive
committee and the ASB, even though they acknowledged that in the past, the POB, in effect, had
approved those nominations informally.
In the end, the POB adopted a pragmatic attitude in order to further the public interest. A charter was
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approved which gave the POB expanded oversight and an enlarged budget and staff. It took effect in
February 2001.
The recommendations of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, including a formal charter for the POB,
were designed to improve the existing voluntary self-regulatory system, not to create a new regula-
tory structure for the profession. At the time of the panel’s recommendations in August 2000, neither
the POB nor members of the panel thought it was likely that Congress would approve a statutory
regulatory organization to govern the profession.
Independence Reviews
In a letter to the POB dated December 9, 1999, then SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner expressed
concern that public accounting firms possibly lacked adequate quality controls for independence. As
a step to “safeguard the public interest,” he “strongly recommend[ed]” that the POB undertake “a
special review of SECPS member firms’ current compliance” with independence requirements. On
December 21, 1999, the POB agreed to do so. Two weeks later, on January 6, 2000, the SEC an-
nounced that an internal investigation at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) had disclosed more
than 8,000 independence violations there. At this time, there were publicly expressed concerns that
the widespread independence violations at PwC might also be found at other large accounting firms
if they were subject to a similar compliance review. Against this background, the POB commenced
preliminary work on the special reviews in January 2000, and had meetings with the firms to discuss
the reviews.
Then, in early May 2000, the POB’s work on the special reviews was stopped by a decision of the
SECPS to cut off funding for them. Mr. Levitt, the Chairman of the SEC, stated that this was “a
significant setback to self-regulation and independent oversight” and raised “serious questions as to
the profession’s commitment to self-regulation.” Melvin Laird, former Congressman and Secretary of
Defense and the longest-serving member of the POB, said that this was “the worst incident in my 17
years” on the POB.
The special reviews did not go forward, but shortly afterward, in June 2000, the SEC and the Big 5
firms entered into a “Term Sheet for Independence Look-Back Testing Program” (term sheet), which
called for the POB to conduct more limited independence reviews.
Subsequently, on October 10, 2000, the POB received a letter from Mr. Turner asking that the POB do
the independence reviews called for by the term sheet “in lieu of” the special reviews previously
requested in his December 1999 letter to the POB. The POB agreed to do so, and commenced
preliminary work on these reviews in November 2000. Between then and January 2002, a period of
more than a year, the POB did a substantial amount of work preparing to conduct the independence
reviews. This work included a request for documents sent to the firms and the SEC staff in July 2001
as well as comprehensive work programs for both phase I (evaluation of design and implementation
effectiveness) and phase II (testing and evaluation of operating effectiveness) of the reviews, sent to
the firms and SEC staff in October 2001 and January 2002, respectively. In addition, the POB was
involved in working with the firms on a confidentiality agreement for the independence reviews. The
POB’s efforts to enter into a confidentiality agreement with the firms, going back to July 2001, met
with no success. In addition, by the middle of January 2002, the POB still had not been able to
obtain from the firms documents it had requested for the independence reviews in July 2001. This
lack of progress in conducting the independence reviews was one of the factors that led to the POB
voting to terminate its existence.
In a letter to the SEC and the firms dated March 5, 2002, the POB set forth its position on the transfer
of its responsibility for conducting the independence reviews to an independent person and dis-
cussed the background of the independence reviews. This letter can be found on the POB’s web site
at www.publicoversightboard.org.
49
The POB Decision to Terminate
As noted above, although the POB commenced preliminary work on the independence reviews in
November 2000, by January 2002, it still had not been able to obtain information and documents it
had requested from the firms in July 2001. The POB was concerned that the lack of progress on the
independence reviews would continue. This lack of progress was one of the considerations that
caused the POB to vote its intention to terminate its existence no later than March 31, 2002.
However, the precipitating factor in the POB’s decision to terminate was the announcement of a
proposed new self-regulatory structure by SEC Chairman Pitt. The POB was not consulted on this
new proposed governance structure for the accounting profession, announced by Mr. Pitt at a press
conference on January 17, 2002, even though the POB had requested and been assured that it would
have the opportunity to provide input as the proposals were being developed and prior to any public
announcement. Instead, without including the POB in the process, the SEC worked privately with
representatives of the AICPA and the Big 5 firms and developed the new SEC proposal. Thus, the
private sector entity which was charged with oversight of the profession’s self-regulatory activities
and with representing the public interest had no input into what may well be the most significant
change in regulating the accounting profession in the last 30 years.
A January 23, 2002 article in The Wall Street Journal reported that a spokesman for PwC confirmed
that chief executives of the Big 5 firms, including PwC, had held a series of private meetings with the
SEC chairman in Washington between December 4, 2001, and January 17, 2002, on this matter, and
that the gatherings “took place at Mr. Pitt’s invitation.”
On the same day that one of these meetings was being held, December 4, 2001, Charles Bowsher,
Chairman of the POB, had a discussion with Barry Melancon, President and CEO of the AICPA, at the
John J. McCloy dinner hosted by the POB. During this discussion, which also included James
Castellano, Chairman of the AICPA, Mr. Melancon told Mr. Bowsher that the profession and the SEC
were working on proposed changes to the governance structure of the accounting profession. Mr.
Bowsher specifically asked that the POB be included in any such discussions so that it would be able
to provide input before any public announcement of a proposed new structure. Mr. Melancon assured
Mr. Bowsher that this would be done.
At a meeting of the SECPS executive committee on January 4, 2002, Mr. Bowsher, Aulana Peters, a
POB member, and Jerry Sullivan, the POB Executive Director, were told that a proposed governance
structure for the profession would be announced within a month. Messrs. Bowsher and Sullivan and
Ms. Peters asked that the POB be “brought in the loop” and be given an opportunity to participate.
They were told the POB would be consulted.
The SEC did not seek input from the POB on the new regulatory structure. While Chairman Pitt had
left a voice message for Mr. Bowsher on January 10, 2002, and Mr. Bowsher had called back twice, in
the end Mr. Bowsher did not receive a return call and the two men did not speak before the press
conference.
On January 17, 2002, Mr. Bowsher received a call from Mr. Melancon and Robert Kueppers, Chair-
man of the SECPS executive committee, a few hours before Mr. Pitt announced the new SEC proposal
at a press conference. In this call, Mr. Bowsher asked specifically if there would be a place for the
POB in the new structure. Mr. Melancon replied that there was no place for the POB in the new
regulatory structure to be announced by Mr. Pitt and that the POB would be a redundancy. Subse-
quently, the POB was advised by the Chairman of the SECPS that the SECPS working group had
provided the SEC with an outline of a proposal a week before the January 17, 2002 press conference.
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The POB believes that one of its primary functions is to facilitate communication. The Panel on
Audit Effectiveness found that “The POB should serve as the oversight body to whom the SEC, the
state boards of accountancy, the auditing profession and the public should look for leadership. This
leadership position is intended to enhance communications among the profession’s self-regulatory
bodies in order to facilitate the profession’s continuous improvement efforts and identify and resolve
important issues on a timely basis.” The panel recommended that the SEC should “[s]upport the
POB’s authority as enumerated in its charter to enable the POB to serve as an independent, effective,
unifying leader of the profession’s voluntary self-regulatory process.”
During Chairman Pitt’s press conference on January 17, he was specifically asked whether there
would be a role for the POB in the new SEC proposal. He did not answer the question.
John Coffee, the distinguished Columbia Law School professor who has written extensively about
securities regulation, faulted the SEC chair for the way in which the new regulatory structure was
created. Professor Coffee said that “It’s not the high watermark of public accountability when the
industry to be regulated designs its own regulatory structure in negotiations with its former lawyer.”
The foregoing was the context in which the POB voted unanimously on January 20, 2002, its
intention to terminate its existence pursuant to Section IX of the POB’s charter no later than March
31, 2002. The reason for this action was that the new SEC proposal had been worked out by the SEC,
in collaboration with the AICPA, SECPS executive committee and representatives of the Big 5 firms,
without any consultation with the POB, which is charged with representing the public interest. The
new proposal rendered the POB a “lame duck”. In making its decision, the POB was also cognizant of
the experience of negotiating its new charter, the fact that the SECPS had cut off funds for the special
reviews, and that there had not been progress in connection with the reviews to which they had
agreed. The POB believed it could not effectively oversee the activities of the accounting profession
under the circumstances and that it would mislead the public to appear to do so. Furthermore, if the
POB were to continue during an interim period before a new governance structure were in place, it
believed it would leave the impression that it approved of the Pitt proposal. As the “conscience and
critic” of the profession, the POB felt it had no choice but to terminate its existence to protect the
public interest. What the POB did was akin to what an auditor does when it believes it must resign
from a client engagement because of a fundamental disagreement.
The POB Proposal for Reform
The Public Oversight Board is mindful that there are many suitable models that could be adopted as
part of a reform program for regulation of the accounting profession. Congress will undoubtedly
consider many of the available options in coming weeks as decisions are made on regulatory changes
in the aftermath of the Enron debacle. Whatever the details of reform, the POB strongly believes that
a legislative foundation for any future regulatory structure is crucial.
Because it has had oversight responsibility for a good portion of the voluntary self-regulatory
structure of the accounting profession for the past 25 years, the POB has first-hand knowledge of the
strengths and weaknesses of the existing system and, thus, a unique perspective on regulatory reform.
The POB considered a number of options for reform based on the present system, but ultimately came
to the conclusion that a complete overhaul is essential. The Board believes that the existing system
has become ineffective.
Dating back to the 1970s, when bribery of foreign officials by American corporations was first
uncovered, followed by the audit failures associated with the bankruptcy of the Penn Central railroad
- the Enron failure of its day - reforms have been largely incremental and piecemeal. The creation of
the POB and other early reforms grew out of hearings in the House and Senate that followed the Penn
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Central bankruptcy and the “sensitive payments” scandal. While the POB believes that many of
these early reforms served a useful purpose and strengthened the profession, it is also clear that in
recent years, regulatory oversight and attempts at further reforms have been met with resistance or
outright rejection by the profession. As noted earlier in this paper, the profession over the past two
years has acted to preserve the status quo and has resisted major reform efforts.
Faced with this opposition, the Public Oversight Board believes the time for legislative action has
come. The current system needs to be replaced. To accomplish this, the POB believes it is essential
that all critical elements of regulation - including all standard setting, inspections and reviews of
accounting firms, enforcement and discipline, and other functions - be placed under the aegis of a
single regulator operating under statutory authority. This new entity - an Independent Institute of
Accountancy (IIA) - would employ a professional staff of individuals unaffiliated with the profession
or any of the Big 5 accounting firms and would be run by a seven-member Board, which itself would
be totally independent of the profession.
The SEC would have oversight of the IIA, and the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant would be the
liaison to the IIA. A chart showing the organizational structure of the IIA is attached as Appendix A.
The Board
Under the POB’s model, the chair and vice chair of the IIA board would be employed on a full-time
basis. Five other members would serve on a part-time basis. Each member, including the chair and
vice chair, would serve a five year term and no member could serve more than two consecutive terms.
To assure future continuity, it is anticipated that the initial membership of the Board would have
staggered terms. While qualified persons with accounting experience, such as retired accounting
professionals, would be allowed to serve on the Board, the majority of members would have no ties
whatever to the profession.
The importance of independence cannot be stressed enough. Independence removes any conflict of
interest - real and apparent - on the part of Board members. Independence enhances the likelihood
that when the narrow needs of the profession conflict with the broader public interest, it is the public
interest that will be served. Independence will also serve the interests of the accounting profession
itself. Because the accounting profession depends on the trust of investors and the public, that trust
will wither and die if the profession is seen to be self-serving in its actions. The best way to keep that
trust is to place regulatory decisions at arms-length in an independent, legislatively mandated
oversight structure within the private sector.
The chair of the Board would be selected by a committee composed of the chair of the SEC, the chair
of the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. Once named, the IIA chair would
become a member of the selection committee and would join in selecting the vice-chairman and the
other members. To assure independence, members could be removed only by a two-thirds vote of the
IIA board itself. Having a selection committee of these individuals would enhance the credibility of
the Institute.
Standards and Interpretation
The POB charter gave it authority to oversee the issuance and interpretation of auditing and inde-
pendence standards for the profession by the ASB and the ISB. Accounting standards have been set
for nearly three decades by FASB.
The POB believes it is time to consolidate all standard setting bodies under one roof. Thus, a basic
and critical function of the new Institute would be oversight of the issuance and interpretation of
accounting, auditing and independence standards for the profession. To accomplish this end, an
Office of Standards would be created by the IIA board and would report to it. Within the Office of
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Standards, separate bodies would be created to issue accounting standards, auditing standards, and
independence standards. While the POB envisions a system in which the IIA board would have
overall authority to create the structure under which standard setting would take place and to make
appropriate rules for the standard setting process, the standard setting bodies within the Office of
Standards would be given considerable autonomy in carrying out their work. A well-staffed and
funded research arm within the Office of Standards would support the standard setting entities. The
Office of Standards would also be charged with issuing interpretations of standards and be subject to
monitoring by the IIA board.
With respect to FASB, the POB is cognizant of its hard work in setting accounting standards for
nearly three decades, but believes it should be integrated along with all standard setting bodies into
one unified and coordinated structure under the aegis of the IIA. Placing the responsibilities of FASB
under the new IIA would lessen the chances of it being influenced by those whose its standards affect
and could likely help alleviate what some - including the current SEC chairman - have said is a slow
process for promulgating standards. As Lee Seidler, Deputy Chairman of the 1978 AICPA Commis-
sion on Auditor’s Responsibilities, testified before the Senate Banking Committee in March 2002,
“FASB has been beset by enormous outside pressures.” Also, former SEC Chairman David Ruder
expressed similar concerns before the same committee in February 2002, noting that “FASB continu-
ally faces difficulties in financing its operations.”
These problems would be alleviated because FASB’s independent funding would be guaranteed by
the IIA. Further, one of the major advantages to placing the activities of FASB under the new IIA
would, as Mr. Turner testified before that committee in February 2002, be “the accounting standard
setting, and enforcement of those standards, residing within a single organization. In turn, when the
disciplinary process identifies shortcomings in the standards, they could then be promptly referred to
the standard setter for timely action.”
With respect to auditing standards, the POB believes that standards promulgated by the current ASB
have not provided guidance that is sufficiently specific and definitive, a problem noted in the
recommendations of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness. The ASB is controlled by the AICPA, and eight
of its 15 members are partners of the eight largest accounting firms. As with other standard setting
entities, it should be placed under the aegis of the newly created Institute.
As discussed earlier, the termination of the ISB - established to create, codify and interpret indepen-
dence standards for auditors of public corporations - has left a significant void. The POB believes
this void should be filled by creating a new entity independent of the profession and operating under
the aegis of the Institute, with sufficient resources and staff to issue clear, unambiguous standards of
independence.
As to the membership of the separate bodies that would be created under the Office of Standards of
the IIA, the POB believes a majority of their members should be independent of the profession. The
new Office of Standards with separate bodies would help alleviate the concerns expressed by former
SEC Chief Accountant Michael Sutton, who testified in February 2002 before the Senate Banking
Committee that “standard setters too often pull their punches, backing down from solutions they
believe are best - perhaps because of a perceived threat to the viability of private sector standards
setting - perhaps because of the sometimes withering strains of managing controversial, but needed
change - perhaps because of a loss of focus on mission and concepts that are supposed to guide their
actions.” Public representation would assure that, at the least, the public had a voice and a vote in the
process.
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Annual and Special Reviews
Since 1977, peer review of one accounting firm by another has been the backbone of the voluntary
self-regulatory system in the United States, and the POB has been charged with overseeing this
process. The POB believes that peer review resulted in major improvements in the profession. The
recommendations that flowed from peer reviews in the early days led to substantive improvements in
the quality controls at accounting firms, large and small. At the same time, as former SEC Chairman
Williams testified on February 12, 2002, before the Senate Banking Committee, peer review “in its
present form [has become] too incestuous. A system needs to be established which is independent of
the accounting profession.”
Because it is not a transparent system (details of peer reviews are not made public) and is limited in
scope (audits subject to investigation or litigation are not looked at as part of a peer review), peer
review has come under considerable criticism from members of Congress, the media, and others. “You
scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” is the prevailing cynical opinion of peer review raised by many.
The Public Oversight Board is of the opinion that peer review, as it has been conducted, should be
discontinued in favor of a more thorough, independent, and transparent system. Each accounting
firm now carries out an internal inspection each year. The POB would mandate that, for firms that
audit more than 100 public corporations each year, these inspections would be subject to a compre-
hensive and thorough review, carried out by an independent professional staff hired by the Institute.
While these reviews would usually look at a representative sample of a firm’s work, IIA reviewers
would have the authority, unlike current peer reviewers, to look at any aspect of a firm’s operations it
might find appropriate. Details would be compiled in reports that would be made available to the
public. Reviews of smaller audit firms would be performed by other firms selected and paid by the
IIA. Their reports would be addressed to the IIA as the client of the reviewer.
Professor Joel Seligman, who testified before the Senate Banking Committee in March 2002 stated
that “the most significant issue may prove to be who conducts periodic examinations and inspec-
tions. To paraphrase the classical adage: Who will audit the auditors? I would urge serious consider-
ation be devoted to replacing peer review with a professional examination staff in the new SRO. Peer
review has been, to some degree, unfairly maligned. But even at its best it involves competitors
reviewing competitors. The temptation to go easy on the firm you review lest it be too critical of you
is an unavoidable one.”
But these reviews are only one piece of an updated oversight structure. To supplement them, the POB
believes that special reviews should be carried out, when warranted, on a case-by-case basis. These
special reviews, similar to those the SEC originally asked the POB to undertake of the Big 5 firms,
could take a more systemic and in-depth look at a firm’s systems, policies, procedures and opera-
tions. If necessary, they would delve deeply into questions affecting a firm’s compliance with SEC
rules and applicable professional standards. As with annual reviews, an independent professional
staff hired by the Institute would carry out any special reviews and results would be public.
Enforcement and Discipline
One of the most pervasive complaints about the current voluntary system is that firms and their
personnel are rarely disciplined by the profession for infractions in carrying out audits or other work.
Dave Cotton, a member of the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Committee’s Technical Standards Sub-
committee, wrote in a January 2002 Washington Post article that, while the Ethics Committee expels
someone from the AICPA five to 10 times a year, “[m]ore typically, when [that] committee finds that a
CPA has violated professional standards, it orders continuing professional education classes. A CPA
found to have violated an accounting standard in connection with a multibillion-dollar corporate
collapse, causing massive damage to investors and the public, might receive this sort of minimal
sanction.”
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When discipline is imposed by the present system, it almost always comes years after the fact
because of procedures which delay the process, including sanctions, until after the outcome of
litigation. Mr. Cotton noted in the Washington Post article cited above that, as a result of delays in
the disciplinary system, “accountants who have committed the most egregious ethical lapses - the
ones resulting in SEC investigations, bankruptcy and litigation - can often continue to practice for
10 years or more after the alleged violation until all the cases are resolved.” Bevis Longstreth, a
former SEC commissioner and member of the POB’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness, stated in his
congressional testimony in February 2002 that the present system “results in long delays in investi-
gation and, as a practical matter, renders the disciplinary function a nullity in almost all instances.”
The POB believes these concerns about the present system have validity and that an effective
mechanism for timely and effective discipline is essential to any reform effort.
One reason for the delay in the current system stems from the fact that those charged with administer-
ing the system lack privilege to ascertain facts. Privilege would give the investigative entity the
authority to protect information it uncovers from outside demands until any enforcement action is
concluded. At present, firms will not disclose documents or other information that is likely to wind
up in the hands of litigants in legal proceedings. As Shaun O’Malley, Chairman of the POB’s Panel
on Audit Effectiveness and former Chairman of Price Waterhouse, pointed out in his testimony in
March 2002 before the Senate Banking Committee, the present system has been “hampered by
distrust and by concerns that the materials developed were not protected. Providing confidentiality
will expedite and vastly improve the review, investigatory, and disciplinary processes.”
Further hampering those charged with discipline in today’s system is the lack of subpoena power.
Because of this, the system may not be able to obtain important information from auditors or audit
clients. Also, sanctions are limited; the most that can be done is expel someone from membership in
the AICPA. Further, the disciplinary process is not transparent, so the public is often unable to
determine what, if any, action has been taken, even with respect to major audit failures.
The POB suggests that an Office of Enforcement and Discipline be formed within the new IIA to have
full legal authority to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by public accounting firms and their
personnel, including subpoena power. The office would be staffed by accounting and other profes-
sionals, as well as investigators. Cases of alleged improper professional conduct would be brought
before IIA hearing officers, who would be charged with recommending, where warranted -after public
notice and opportunity for public hearing - that the IIA board impose sanctions that would range
from fines to suspension or expulsion from the profession. Cases could be referred to the Justice
Department for possible prosecution, or to the SEC, state boards of accountancy, or other agencies, as
appropriate.
Allegations brought before the Office of Enforcement and Discipline would go forward to investiga-
tion regardless of any pending litigation, unlike the present system. Disciplinary hearings and
decisions would be public.
Funding and Staff
If the Institute is to be successful in all that it is charged with overseeing and regulating, it must be
appropriately funded and it must have an adequate, well-trained staff. It is clear that to attract a
talented staff, competitive salaries must be available. Further, the Institute must be assured that the
funds will be there when needed.
Former SEC Chairman Williams testified before the Senate Banking Committee in February 2002
that the POB “is not adequately funded and is beholden for its funding to the very people it is
supposed to oversee. I suggest that the SEC consider a requirement that a percentage of the audit fees
of public companies be assessed to pay for independent oversight, whether it is the Public Oversight
Board or a successor body, so that its funding is assured.”
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Another former Chairman of the SEC, David Ruder, said in testimony the same day that: “Indepen-
dent and adequate funding is crucial. An independent body that depends upon sporadic voluntary
contributions from industry or the financial community may risk loss of financial support if it takes
positions seen as contrary to the best interest of those it regulates.”
The POB recommends that funding be provided through fees imposed on public corporations in an
amount that would be sufficient to cover the costs of the Institute. The fees would vary according to
the total revenues of the corporation. The POB strongly believes that the funding mechanism must be
beyond the reach of the profession to prevent it from withholding necessary funds, as it did in May
of 2000.
International Liaison
Convergence of international accounting and auditing standards is one of the most pressing issues
facing the profession. In an era when major firms either own or are affiliated with large accounting
entities throughout the world and major corporations engage in global trade, common accounting
and auditing standards are fast becoming a critical need. The Public Oversight Board believes that
international liaison should be a primary function of the Institute.
Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve Chairman and Chairman of the trustees of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), told the Senate Banking Committee in February 2002 that
FASB and IASB were working together on a number of issues and that the “result should be conver-
gence and significant improvement in both bodies of standards.” Since the IIA would oversee
accounting standard setting as well as auditing and independence standard setting, the Institute
would be in the best position to act as international liaison to promote convergence and significant
improvement to U.S. and international standards. This is a POB function under its charter and should
be transitioned to a new regulatory body.
Continuing Professional Education
Education has always been a hallmark of the accounting profession, and accountants and auditors are
required to accumulate 80 hours of continuing professional education credits every two years. As
important as education has been in the past, however, it will become even more crucial in years to
come. The ability of auditors to deal with audits of companies involved in cross border offerings and
derivatives and other new financial instruments that are constantly being invented is largely depen-
dent upon their ability to understand them - and that is a function of education. Similarly, conver-
gence of standards across international boundaries will present new and unprecedented challenges to
accountants and auditors and only continuing education will make it possible for the profession to
remain on top of new developments. For these reasons, continuing education should be a primary
focus of the new Institute.
Other Matters Affecting the Profession
Beyond the regulatory structure of a new system, the POB believes there are a number of other issues
that should be addressed as part of legislation creating a charter for the new Institute.
Auditor Independence
The POB recognizes that there are several models available to deal with the matter of auditor
independence and that there continue to be disagreements on this matter.
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness, for example, was split on the issue of scope of services for audit
clients. Some panel members wanted to essentially ban non-audit services for audit clients. But these
members would have allowed a “carefully circumscribed exception” if the client’s audit committee
56
(composed only of independent directors) found that the best interests of the company and its
shareholders would be served by retaining its auditor to render such non-audit services in cases
where “no other vendor of such service can serve those interests as well.” This proposal would also
have required submission of such a finding to the SEC and POB and disclosure in the corporation’s
proxy statement of the finding and the amount paid for the non-audit services.
On the other hand, those on the panel who opposed restricting non-audit services - a majority - held
that “audit firms can provide both audit and non-audit services to the same public audit client, and
with proper safeguards and disclosures, can maintain independence and objectivity.” Those taking
this view believed that “nothing in the long history of the profession’s providing non-audit services
has indicated otherwise.”
Mr. Volcker said during the September 2000 public hearings on the SEC’s proposed independence
rules that
The extent to which the conflict has in practice actually distorted auditing practice is con-
tested. And surely, instances of overt and flagrant violations of auditing standards in return
for contractual favors-an auditing capital offense so to speak-must be rare. But more insidi-
ous, hard-to-pin down, not clearly articulated or even consciously realized, influences on
audit practices are another matter.
Importantly, President Bush’s 10-point plan “to improve corporate responsibility and protect
America’s shareholders,” announced in March 2002, provides that “Investors should have complete
confidence in the independence and integrity of companies’ auditors.” The specifics on this plan
recognize the importance of prohibiting certain non-audit services in order to safeguard auditor
independence.
On February 1, 2002, the AICPA issued a statement, which said it “will not oppose federal legislation
restricting the scope of services that accountants may provide their public audit clients, specifically
in information technology and internal audit design and implementation.”
In considering this matter, the POB started from the premise that the accountant’s audit and report
add significant credibility and reliability to a corporation’s financial statements in the process of
capital formation and that the foundation of that credibility is auditor independence.
To effectively assure independence, the POB believes legislation governing non-audit services to
audit clients is necessary. The POB proposes that SEC regulations concerning independence be
legislatively codified with appropriate revisions to update restrictions on scope of services involving
information technology and internal audit services as noted above.
The POB believes such legislation should also affirm that tax work not involving advocacy and
attest work in connection with SEC registration and other SEC filings be allowed, and that small
public businesses, to be defined by the SEC, should not be subject to any restriction on non-audit
services. Further, with respect to non-public corporations, it is the POB’s position that such corpora-
tions and the accounting firms that audit them should not be subject to any restriction on non-audit
services. We expressly emphasize this to avoid misunderstanding and any consequences to small
business and small audit firms.
The IIA Office of Standards should be empowered to promulgate appropriate rules affecting indepen-
dence to cover changing circumstances. The POB also believes that non-restricted, non-audit
services should require approval by the audit committee if it finds such services to be compatible
with maintaining independence. Also required would be prompt notification to the IIA Office of
Standards and public disclosure in current reports and proxy statements filed with the SEC.
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The POB believes there should be no prohibition against an audit firm offering non-audit services to
non-audit clients.
Auditor Rotation and Retention
The POB believes that the time has come to require rotation of auditors every seven years. The one
effective way to prevent the emergence of too close a relationship between a corporation and its
auditor is to make certain that auditors are rotated periodically. While there is merit to the argument
that a long-term relationship helps the auditor do a better job, it is also true that a new auditor every
seven years would provide the corporation with the benefit of a fresh perspective.
The POB agrees with its member, John Biggs, who testified in February 2002 before the Senate
Banking Committee that auditor rotation is a “powerful antidote” to auditor conflicts of interest,
which “reduces dramatically the financial incentives for the audit firms to placate management”. In
addition, as Mr. Biggs stated, rotation “reduces the problem of cross-selling other services and is
likely to eliminate the revolving door that allows former auditors to become the top financial officers
of the audited company.” The POB also supports Mr. Biggs’ idea, described in his testimony, that the
new auditor at the time of rotation should do “an exhaustive review of the former audit work papers”
that would assure “transactions and documentation were fully transparent.” In addition, the new
auditor could do “a brief, signed peer review report” on its predecessor.
As a corollary to auditor rotation, the POB recommends that public corporations be prohibited from
firing auditors during their term of service. As former SEC Chairman Williams stated in his testimony
before the Senate Banking Committee, the benefit of such a retention requirement is that “the auditor
would be assured of the assignment and, therefore, would not be threatened with the loss of the client
and could exercise truly independent judgment.”
The POB recommends allowing an exception to this retention requirement if the audit committee
determines that an exception is in the best interest of shareholders, with prompt notice to the IIA and
the SEC. Such action would be required to be publicly disclosed by corporations in current reports
and proxy statements filed with the SEC. The POB also believes that audit committees, in engaging
the auditor, should give primary consideration to the quality of the audit firm and its audit plan, and
not to the lowest price.
The POB is cognizant that if an auditor rotation regulation is included in legislation, action will
have to be taken to phase in the new system. The POB recommends giving the IIA authority to
promulgate new rules governing the transition to an auditor rotation system. Actual rotation of
auditors would begin only after those rules are in place.
Cooling Off Period
For many years, members of Congress and senior federal government officials have been required to
enter a “cooling off” period during which they are prohibited from taking certain actions, such as
lobbying, on behalf of their new employer. The objective is obvious: to guard against undue
influence by former colleagues and friends when it comes to making government decisions that
could benefit the new employer of the former official.
The POB believes such a cooling off period is sound policy and feels a variant of it should be
applied to the accounting profession when senior partners leave their firms. Specifically, the POB
recommends that engagement and other partners who are associated with an audit be prohibited from
taking employment with the affected firm until a two-year period has expired. This would end the
current situation in which there is at least the appearance of impropriety in audit firms being unduly
influenced by former colleagues who have taken senior positions with existing audit clients.
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As Mr. Seidler said in his testimony this February, “the former auditor knows exactly how his or her
former firm conducts the audit,” and also “knows how far former compatriots can be pushed to accept
results preferred by management.” Mr. Seidler added that “’we are all friends’, is not exactly the
appropriate relationship between independent auditor and client.”
It is also important to recognize that in the cases of Lincoln Savings and Loan, Waste Management
and, most recently, Enron and Global Crossing, senior financial officers at the company came from
the outside audit firm.
Under the POB proposal, the IIA board would have the authority to adopt specific rules affecting this
proposed cooling off period.
Audit Committees
The POB believes that the Institute should expand on the recommendations of the Report and
Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees, which made it clear that the external auditor should be accountable to a firm’s board of
directors and its audit committee and not to management. Specifically, the POB believes audit
committees should take full responsibility for hiring, evaluating, and - if necessary - terminating an
audit firm.
Conflicts of Interest
To discourage conflicts of interest involving public corporations, Congress should amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require more meaningful and timely disclosure of related party
transactions among officers, directors, or other affiliated persons and the public corporation. Such
disclosures should be made promptly in current reports as well as in proxy statements filed with the
SEC.
Internal Controls
In the 1980s, a series of major business failures, particularly those involving financial institutions,
led to congressional hearings on auditing and financial reporting matters. Out of those hearings, the
FDICIA became law. This Act required among other things, that management report on internal
controls and, further, that the independent auditors examine and report on those management
assertions.
The Special Report by the POB dated March 5, 1993 on “Issues Confronting the Accounting
Profession” recommended that the SEC require public companies to include with their annual
financial statements “(a) a report by management on the effectiveness of the entity’s internal control
system relating to financial reporting; and (b) a report by the [entity’s] independent accountant on
the entity’s internal control system relating to financial reporting.” The POB, in support of this
recommendation, stated: “The Board believes that requiring auditors to assess management’s reports
on the quality of internal controls will benefit the public. First, the auditing profession’s evaluation
of internal control systems will lead to improvements in those systems. Second, as long as compa-
nies’ boards and top management demand conformity with those systems, the improved systems will
make management fraud and manipulation of financial reporting more difficult.”
Just a few months later, in a June 1993 position statement, the AICPA Board of Directors stated:
To provide further assurance to the investing public, we join the POB in calling for a state-
ment by management, to be included in the annual report, on the effectiveness of the company’s
internal controls over financial reporting, accompanied by an auditor’s report on management’s
assertions. An assessment by the independent auditor will provide greater assurance to inves-
tors as to management’s statement. The internal control system is the main line of defense
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against fraudulent financial reporting. The investing public deserves an independent assess-
ment of that line of defense, and management should benefit from the auditor’s perspective
and insights. We urge the SEC to establish this requirement.
The General Accounting Office discussed this issue of reporting on internal controls in its 1996
report, “The Accounting Profession”. The GAO pointed out that the POB had said “it was disap-
pointed by the failure of the SEC to take action to mandate issuer and auditor reporting on internal
controls. The POB agreed with us that such action would add immeasurably to the ability to prevent
and detect fraud and would in general enhance the quality of finance reporting.” The GAO stated that
the SEC was “the key player” here and, further, that the SEC should move forward on this important
issue. So far, the SEC has not done so.
Management of public corporations should be required to prepare an annual statement of compliance
with internal controls to be filed with the SEC. The corporation’s chief financial officer and chief
executive officer should sign this attestation and the auditor should review it. An auditor’s review
and report on the effectiveness of internal controls would - as the GAO found in its report - improve
“the auditor’s ability to provide more relevant and timely assurances on the quality of data beyond
that contained in traditional financial statements and disclosures.”
In addition, strengthened internal controls over financial reporting should improve quarterly
statements, interim disclosures and earnings estimates that are the basis for many market price
changes during the year. They should also be helpful in avoiding restatements that are now seen so
frequently.
Conclusion
The Public Oversight Board has not come lightly to its recommendations for reform. For many
months, members of the POB hoped that patient negotiation and discussion would prevail. In the
end, however, it became apparent to the POB that real reform will take place only when Congress
requires it through legislative action.
A decade ago Congress acted in the public interest when it voted major reforms in the banking
industry - reforms that were widely opposed by the banks and their lobbyists. Opponents then
predicted gloom and doom for the industry should the proposed reforms be enacted. In reality, the
reforms contained in the FDICIA repaired flaws in regulation of the nation’s banking industry. More
important, they significantly strengthened the industry.
Today the Congress again is called upon to institute reform. In the wake of the Enron debacle, the
POB, acting as the “conscience and critic” of the profession, strongly believes that to protect
investors and the public, the old system of voluntary self-regulation for the accounting industry must
be replaced. While many will urge that Congress act with caution and that the profession be again
given the opportunity to fix the present system with marginal changes, the POB believes it is time to
resist the continuation of the status quo and move ahead with fundamental change.
In short, the POB believes it is time for Congress to enact the kind of reform that will make a real
difference.
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P U B L I C  O V E R S I G H T  B O A R D
Previous Recipients:
1988 - Donald L. Neebes and
James B. Luton, Jr.
1989 - LeRoy Layton
1990 - Thomas L. Holton
1991 - Barbara H. Franklin
1992 - A. Clarence Sampson
1993 - Wallace E. Olson
1994 - Philip L. Defliese
The John J. McCloy Award
In 1988, the POB initiated a program to honor those who
have made significant contributions to strengthening audit
quality control and effectiveness in the United States.
2001 Recipient
The Public Oversight Board selected J. Michael Cook as
the recipient of the 2001 John J. McCloy Award for out-
standing contributions to the auditing profession in the
U.S.
His leadership and commitment to improving the reliability
and enhancing the credibility of the financial reporting
process have characterized Mr. Cook’s career. That leader-
ship and commitment have been exhibited through his
outstanding contributions to his firm, the accounting and
auditing standards-setting processes, the governance of the
profession, and the business community at large.
Mr. Cook served as Deloitte & Touche’s Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer from June 1986 until May 1999.
He has served on the Board of the AICPA, and as the
Institute’s Chairman. He served as the Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation -
the overseer of the FASB and the GASB. On the interna-
tional level, he has chaired the World Congress of Accoun-
tants.
Mr. Cook currently is the Chairman of the General Account-
ing Office’s Accountability Advisory Panel, which provides
guidance to the Comptroller General and other GAO
executives.
1995 - David B. Pearson
1996 - David L. Landsittel
1997 - Vincent M. O’Reilly
1998 - Dan M. Guy
1999 - Ralph S. Saul
2000 - Shaun F. O’Malley
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JOHN J. McCLOY
(1978 - 1984)
One of the original Board
members; POB Chairman from
inception to 1984; former Partner
in law firm of Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy; Assistant
Secretary of War during World
War II; received AICPA’s Medal
of Honor for distinguished
service to the accounting
profession. Mr. McCloy’s service
to the profession is honored each
year with the POB’s McCloy
award, presented to a distin-
guished individual from the
accounting profession. Died on
March 11, 1989.
RAY GARRETT, JR.
(1978 - 1980)
One of the original Board
members; POB Vice-Chairman
from its inception to February
1980; Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission,
1973-1975; retired Partner of law
firm, Carton & Douglas. Died on
February 3, 1980.
WILLIAM L. CARY
(1978 - 1982)
One of the original Board
members; Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1961-1964; former
Professor of Law, Columbia
University. Died on February 7,
1983.
JOHN D. HARPER
(1978 - 1985)
One of the original Board
members; former Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive
Officer of ALCOA, 1970-1975;
member of a Presidential
Commission; a director of
several public companies. Died
on July 26, 1985.
ARTHUR M. WOOD
(1978 - 1986)
One of the original Board
members; POB Chairman, 1984-
1986; POB Vice Chairman, 1982-
1984; former Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive
Officer of Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
1973-1978; a director of several
public companies.
ROBERT K. MAUTZ
(1981 - 1995)
Vice Chairman, 1987-1995;
former Director of the Paton
Accounting Center and Professor
of Accounting, University of
Michigan; former Professor,
University of Illinois; former
President of the American
Accounting Association; former
member of AICPA Board of
Directors; former member of the
Cost Accounting Standards
Board; received the AICPA’s
Gold Medal Award for Distin-
guished Service.
A. A. SOMMER, JR.
(1983-1999)
Chairman, 1986-1999, Vice
Chairman, 1985-1986; received
the AICPA’s Medal of Honor for
his distinguished service to the
accounting profession; Partner
with the law firm of Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius; SEC Commis-
sioner, 1973-1976. Died on
January 14, 2002.
MELVIN R. LAIRD
(1984-2001)
Served as the Vice Chairman
from 1997-1999. Mr. Laird
served as Representative in the
U.S. Congress from Wisconsin for
nine terms (1953-1969),
Secretary of Defense from 1969
to 1973, and Counselor to the
President for Domestic Affairs,
1973-1974.
PAUL W. McCRACKEN
(1985-1997)
Vice Chairman from 1995-1997;
Chairman of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers,
1969-1971; President of the
American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1986;
distinguished Professor Emeritus
of Business Administration,
Economic and Public Policy,
University of Michigan.
ROBERT F. FROEHLKE
(1987-2000)
Secretary of the Army, 1971-
1973; Chairman of the Board of
Equitable Life Assurance Society
1982-1987; former President and
CEO of IDS Mutual Fund Group.
PAUL H. O’NEILL
(2000-December 31, 2000)
Chair and CEO of ALCOA,
1987-2000; President of
International Paper Company,
1977-1987; Deputy Director of
U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, 1974-1977; resigned to
become the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury.
Other
Members
Who Served
Through
December
31, 2000
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